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Abstract 
 
 By investigating the cognitive capacities of non-human primates, we can begin 
to understand the cognitive capacities of the evolutionary ancestors we share with 
these species. While there is a great deal of research exploring the socio-cognitive 
abilities of simian primates, prosimians have not been sufficiently studied. Without 
data from these species, our knowledge about the evolution of the primate mind is 
limited to the common ancestor shared between simian primates only, precluding 
understanding of the phylogenetic origins of certain phenomena.  
 I explored the socio-cognitive capacities of lemurs, a type of prosimian 
primate. I studied several areas of social cognition related to social referencing, 
defined as the ability to use and seek out social information when appraising objects 
or events. As social referencing is a popular subject in both human developmental and 
non-human primate literature, I aimed to determine how prosimians’ capacities 
compare.  
 My research was conducted with captive lemurs of three species: Eulemur 
fulvus fulvus, Eulemur macaco macaco, and Eulemur fulvus rufus. I found that lemurs 
use social cues regarding food palatability to modify their own feeding behaviour and 
that they visually attend to conspecifics differently when presented with novel, as 
compared to familiar, foods. Lemurs also visually referred to a human experimenter’s 
face when presented with an anomalous interaction and went on to engage in gaze 
alternation. Lemurs failed to use information about the experimenter’s attentional 
state, however, when modifying their use of a trained gesture. Finally, I found that 
lemurs are able to visually co-orient with conspecifics, correctly prioritising 
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information from the head over that from the body, and that they go on to use 
conspecific gaze to locate hidden resources. 
 These results show that lemurs are more cognitively advanced than previously 
thought and the origins of some social referencing skills may be phylogenetically 
older than previously hypothesised.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 To live in a group is to live with competitors. Animals that rest, travel, forage, 
and play together are also in constant competition with one another for access to 
resources such as food and mates (Humphrey, 1976; Janson & van Schaik, 1988). 
However, group living can provide benefits that make it all worthwhile. The more 
individuals there are in a given area, the more likely it is that a predator will be 
detected and effectively escaped or defeated (Jolly, 1966; van Schaik, 1983; Strier, 
2003). Although an individual might experience competition for access to food from 
group members, a group as a whole is better at monopolising a rich food source than 
an individual would be on its own (Wrangham, 1980; Wrangham, 1982; Janson & van 
Schaik, 1988; Strier, 2003). Being in a group that includes kin provides an individual 
with valuable allies (Chapais, 2001). And living in a group with others gives an 
individual the potential to obtain and use social information from them: this is the 
focus of my dissertation. 
As animals go about their daily activities, their natural behaviour, including 
affective displays, object manipulation, and the directing of visual attention toward 
objects of interest (Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995), potentially provides useful 
information to those around them (Galef & Giraldeau, 2001). One of the most 
interesting benefits of group living is the opportunity to gather information from other 
individuals by visually attending to them and then using that information in appraising 
objects or events, a mechanism called social referencing. The process of social 
referencing includes both the passive use of information that happens to be available 
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through the behaviour of others and also the active seeking of that information when it 
is needed (Feinman, 1982). Both methods enable an individual to learn important 
aspects of an object or event (e.g., its location, whether it is safe or dangerous) 
without requiring direct experience (Feinman, 1982; Klinnert et al., 1983; Phillips et 
al., 1992; Heyes, 1993).  
By attending to group members’ behaviour toward, or in reaction to, certain 
objects or events, an individual can learn a great deal (Range et al., In press). For 
example, seeing a conspecific spit out a piece of food could alert an observer not to 
ingest the same item. Or, following the direction of another individual’s attention 
could facilitate an observer’s detection of a predator or food resource. Individuals 
engaging in social referencing might be expected to alternate their gaze between a 
potential informant and an object of interest and should go on to modify their 
behaviour based on the information that was gained (Klinnert et al., 1983; Heyes, 
1993).  
Because individual learning can be a costly endeavour, as the rate of error can 
be high and errors can result in tragic outcomes, mechanisms like social referencing, 
which allow an individual to learn about objects in the environment without the need 
for direct experience, should be favoured through natural selection (Heyes, 1993; 
Boyd & Richerson, 1996). Given the highly adaptive value of social referencing 
abilities and the cognitive similarities between humans and other primates, it is 
possible that this mechanism is widely used in the primate order (Boccia & Campos, 
1987). However, while many studies have focused on these abilities in simian 
primates (see chapters 3-5 for reviews), prosimian species have been neglected in 
comparative research efforts. Not only does this create a “taxonomic gap” in our 
understanding of primate cognition (Tomasello & Call, 1997), but it does so at a key 
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section of the primate evolutionary tree. Without data from prosimian primates, our 
knowledge about the evolution of the primate mind is limited to the common ancestor 
shared between simian primates only. To help fill this gap, my dissertation focuses on 
the social referencing abilities of a type of prosimian primate: the lemur. 
 In this introductory chapter, I will first provide some information about what 
lemurs are, and also review some of the work that has been done by other researchers 
exploring lemurs’ cognitive capacities. To close the chapter, I will discuss the aims of 
my thesis and provide an overview of how I have organised the remaining chapters. 
 
 
1.1 – Lemurs 
 
Marty the Zebra: [about King Julian, a ring-tailed lemur] He's got style.  
Alex the Lion: What is he, like, king of the guinea pigs?  
Melman the Giraffe: I think it's a squirrel.  
King Julian: Welcome... Please feel free to bask in my glow.  
Alex the Lion: Definitely a squirrel.  
Melman the Giraffe: Yep, a squirrel. 
   – Madagascar, a Dreamworks Animation film 
 
Look! It’s a pile of poo! 
  - Boy, 6, upon seeing a sleeping red-fronted lemur at Edinburgh Zoo 
 
 The name ‘lemur’ comes from the Latin word “lemures,” meaning “ghosts” or 
“spirits” (not “poo”), and is a reference to many lemurs’ nocturnal lifestyle, their 
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large, reflective eyes, and some species’ eerie howling and screeching vocalisations. 
Unlike their squirrel look-a-likes, lemurs actually belong to a group of primates called 
the prosimians, from which the more highly derived simian lineage split off around 
sixty million years ago (Tattersall, 1982; Sauther et al., 1999; Yoder & Yang, 2004; 
Figure 1.1). Lemurs are found on the African island nation of Madagascar and a few  
 
~60 mya
~40 mya
~25 mya
~6 mya
 
Figure 1.1 – A basic representation of the primate lineage. Primates to the left are most distantly 
related to humans, and primates to the right are more closely related. From left to right: prosimians 
(red-fronted lemur), New World monkeys (brown capuchin), Old World monkeys (Diana monkey), 
non-human great apes (chimpanzee, photograph by Marietta Dindo), and humans (Frank Sinatra, 
photograph from www.amazon.com). Listed are the dates, in million years ago (mya), of the last 
common ancestor shared with humans. 
 
 
surrounding islands, such as Mayotte. Today, lemurs make up 13% of all living 
primate species (Martin, 2000), a relatively large proportion given the small size of 
Madagascar compared to the regions of Africa, Asia, and Central and South America 
where the rest of the primates are found. Lemurs are also one of the most threatened 
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primate taxa, partially due to the loss of between 80 percent and 90 percent of forest 
habitat on Madagascar, which has led to forest fragmentation limiting home ranges 
and genetic diversity (Lehman et al., 2006; Olivieri et al., 2008).  
 Lemurs are relatively small-brained (Armstrong, 1985) and are the most 
primitive group-living primate (Bearder, 1987; Richard, 1987), which means they are 
more like the original primates of tens of millions of years ago than are simian 
primates (Tomasello & Call, 1997). For example, lemurs have retained many 
ancestral mammalian traits, such as the possession of a wet rhinarium on the end of 
the nose, which aids in olfaction (Byrne, 1995; Sauther et al., 1999; Yoder & Yang, 
2004). Nevertheless, like many simian primates, lemurs form complex groups 
composed of individuals of all ages and sexes, characterized by kinship and other 
relationships maintained through social play and grooming (Jolly, 1966; Richard, 
1987; Pereira et al., 1990; Kappeler & Ganzhorn, 1993). As such, lemurs face social 
problems similar to those faced by group-living simians, such as learning the rank and 
behavioural patterns of other group members and engaging in social interactions 
accordingly (Jolly, 1966). Allison Jolly (1966) has written, “In social behaviour, as in 
anatomy, … lemurs are generally primate in structure.” Research exploring the 
cognitive capacities of lemurs, however, is minimal and focuses mainly on non-social 
aspects of cognition, such as lemurs’ ability to manipulate objects and their 
understanding of number and ordinal relationships. 
 
1.1.1 – Early work 
 
 Harlow and colleagues (Harlow et al., 1932; Maslow & Harlow, 1932) 
conducted a series of studies exploring various primate species’ performance on a 
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delayed response test. In this type of task, the experimenter allows the subject to 
witness the hiding of a food item in one of two locations. He then lets the subject 
search for the food after a set amount of time has passed, with the goal of determining 
how long the subject can wait before its ability to choose the correct hiding spot 
deteriorates. When comparing data across primate genera, researchers found that 
lemurs’ search accuracy decreased sooner than that of monkeys and apes. These 
findings were corroborated by research conducted by Jolly (1964b). 
 Differences between lemurs and simian species were also found in the way in 
which individuals manipulate objects. Jolly noted that lemurs in the wild rarely 
manipulated inedible objects (1966) but did interact with items that were not baited 
with food in captivity (Jolly, 1964a; 1964b). However, researchers have reported that 
lemurs manipulated inedible objects in less diverse ways than simian primates did 
(Parker, 1973; Parker, 1974; Torigoe, 1985), as lemurs regularly picked up these 
items and transported them but failed to bring these items in contact with other objects 
through actions such as sliding, rolling, or throwing. 
 Davis and Leary (1968) tested both monkeys and lemurs in a bent-wire detour 
task, which requires a subject to move a piece of food to the end of a wire on which 
the food is threaded. This wire contains a series of L-shaped bends and, as such, 
subjects sometimes need to push the food away from them in order to succeed. Davis 
and Leary found that both Old and New World monkeys performed better on this task 
than lemurs did. Jolly (1964a, b) has also reported poor performance on puzzle tasks 
that require subjects to push an apparatus away from themselves or manipulate objects 
that are not in direct contact with a food reward in order to retrieve it. 
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Given lemurs’ inferior performance on these types of tasks, as compared to 
that of simian species, Alison Jolly (1966) has concluded, “Lemurs show that primate 
society could develop without the particular cleverness of our own ancestors.” 
 
1.1.2 – Lemurs revisited 
  
 These early studies comparing lemurs’ behaviour to that of simian primates 
helped to create an idea that lemurs’ cognitive abilities are fewer and less varied than 
those of monkeys and apes. However, more recent work is challenging this 
impression, as researchers are now reporting performances on some tasks that are 
similar to those of simians. 
 
Object manipulation 
  
 In response to early findings that lemurs manipulate objects in less diverse 
ways than simian primates do, Tomasello and Call (1997) cautioned that, as the 
objects were not presented with any potential goal, these studies only investigated 
subjects’ ability to manipulate objects in the context of exploring objects for 
exploration’s sake. They speculated that perhaps given motivation lemurs would be 
more interested in exploring and using items in more varied ways, which would show 
that a failure to display manipulation in a play context does not imply a lack of the 
capacity to understand object-object relations altogether. 
 Recently, Santos and colleagues (2005b) provided the context Tomasello and 
Call had called for by exploring whether lemurs recognise the functionally relevant 
aspects of tools. They reported that lemurs were able to manipulate tools to a more 
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useful position when these tools were oriented incorrectly. Further, lemurs correctly 
prioritised tool size, and appropriately ignored colour and texture, when choosing 
between two possible pulling tools with which to retrieve a food reward. 
 
Numbers and ordinal relationships 
 
 Lemurs have also recently been shown to have relatively sophisticated 
numerical cognition abilities. In a paradigm traditionally used to explore what human 
infants know about number (Wynn, 1992), subjects are shown one object on a stage. 
The stage is then covered with a screen, behind which an experimenter places a 
second item. The screen is then lifted to reveal the expected outcome of two objects, 
or an unexpected event of one object, three objects, or one very large object. By 
measuring subjects’ looking time, researchers have found that human infants can 
discriminate between the expected and unexpected events, suggesting a capacity for 
enumerating small sets of objects. In two studies with lemurs, researchers have shown 
that prosimians share this ability with humans (Santos et al., 2005a; Mahajan et al., In 
press).  
 To explore lemurs’ understanding of ordinal relationships, MacLean and 
colleagues (2008) used a touch screen to present pairs of stimuli to lemurs in order to 
determine whether these animals are capable of transitive inference (i.e., given that A 
is greater than B and B is greater than C, the ability to reason that A is greater than C). 
In the first phase of the experiment, subjects were required to touch the higher ranking 
(as determined by the researcher) of two photographs and were trained on specific 
pairings (e.g., A and B, B and C). In the test phase, new combinations were presented 
(e.g., A and C). The researchers found that lemurs correctly chose the higher ranking 
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of the two stimuli in these novel pairings, suggesting that lemurs have transitive 
inference abilities. 
 
Communication 
 
 Captive ring-tailed lemurs use different calls for different types of predators 
and respond differently to these calls in playbacks (Macedonia, 1990; Macedonia & 
Yount, 1991). Researchers reported that while lemurs first emitted a “gulp” in 
response to any predator, they followed by emitting different calls for aerial or ground 
predators. In playback experiments in which these calls were played through 
loudspeakers in the absence of a predator, researchers found that lemurs responded 
differentially to each type of call by using an appropriate escape strategy.  
 Another lemur species, the ruffed lemur, was not found to have similar 
referential signalling capacities (Macedonia, 1990). 
 
Self-control 
 
 Genty and colleagues (2004) explored lemurs’ capacity for self-control. In this 
type of study, subjects are presented with two arrays of food rewards, one consisting 
of more food items than the other. The subject is then allowed to reach for one in 
order to receive a reward. However, after the subject reaches for one array, the 
experimenter gives the subject the array it did not choose. As a result, subjects must 
suppress their tendency to reach for the larger reward and, instead, reach for the less 
desirable of the two options in order to receive the most food. In this task, lemurs 
were able to exhibit self-control by inhibiting their natural impulse to reach for the 
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larger of two rewards after training similar, both in number of trials and method, to 
training procedures used with simian primates (Silberberg & Fujita, 1996; Anderson 
et al., 2000). 
 
1.1.3 – What about social cognition? 
 
 In 1997, Tomasello and Call pointed out that we know very little about 
prosimians in the domain of social cognition. Unfortunately, not much has changed in 
the last decade. But with growing evidence that lemurs share with simian primates 
many non-social cognitive abilities that researchers had expected they would not, it is 
possible that they also share many socio-cognitive abilities with simians, as well. 
Shepherd and Platt (2008) have reported that when lemurs are not moving around 
their environment (thereby, physical features of their surroundings do not require as 
much attention), they show a preference for visually attending to social stimuli, such 
as conspecifics and human experimenters. With special attention paid to other 
individuals, it is possible that lemurs gather and use social information in ways similar 
to other primates. However, research focusing on topics related to prosimian social 
referencing is lacking at best, leaving us with many unanswered questions about their 
cognitive abilities. 
 
 
1.2 – General Aims 
 
 Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) put it simply: “We will never fully understand the 
true function of our own psychological structures until after we fully understand the 
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timing and purpose of their origin.” I could not agree more. While comparative 
research with apes and monkeys is critical for understanding the evolutionary origins 
of the modern primate mind, prosimians are more like the original primates of tens of 
millions of years ago than are the simians (Tomasello & Call, 1997). As such, the 
earliest primate about which we can obtain insight through comparative research is 
the evolutionary ancestor common between lemurs and humans (Byrne, 1995). This 
opportunity should not be overlooked, as we will never gain a thorough understanding 
of the primate mind if prosimian species continue to be neglected in socio-cognitive 
research.  
 The aim of my dissertation work was to begin to explore several areas of 
social cognition that have been popular topics of research for those working with 
monkeys and apes, all of which have implications for the understanding of social 
referencing. As such, this dissertation includes three data chapters (chapters 3-5), each 
focusing on one of these topics. Within each data chapter I provide some background 
information about the topic, the details of two experiments concerning that chapter’s 
topic, and a discussion of the findings. In chapter 2, I introduce the subjects that 
participated in these experiments and go over common experimental methods and 
procedures. In chapter 3, I discuss the gathering and use of information from social 
sources in a foraging context. In the first experiment, I provided lemurs with palatable 
or unpalatable food items and examined the feeding behaviour of those individuals 
who had witnessed their group member consume or reject food. In the second, I went 
on to explore whether lemurs exhibit differential looking strategies when presented 
with novel, as compared to familiar, foods in order to investigate whether they 
actively seek out information from others. In chapter 4, I examine social referencing 
during social interactions and also whether lemurs modify their behaviour depending 
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on the human social cues with which they are presented. In the two experiments 
detailed in this chapter, I presented lemurs with an anomalous social situation and 
measured whether they used gaze alternation as a visual monitoring method and 
whether lemurs adjusted their behavioural responses according to my attentional state. 
In chapter 5, I explore gaze following and whether lemurs use the direction of another 
individual’s gaze to locate hidden objects. In the first experiment of this chapter, I 
explored whether lemurs follow the gaze of conspecifics and what cues they use when 
doing so. In the second, I presented lemurs with conspecific gaze cues in a modified 
object-choice task in order to explore whether gaze following has any consequence 
for subsequent action. Finally, in chapter 6, I discuss the results of all six experiments 
together in order to put lemurs into the larger picture of primate social cognition and 
briefly discuss whether lemurs are capable of mental state attribution. 
Through these experiments and discussions, I hope to provide useful insight 
into the evolution of primate cognition and to open opportunities for further work, 
which I hope that researchers, including myself, will be able to take on in the near 
future.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I will provide information about the subjects that participated in 
my experiments, as well as testing procedures that were common to all experiments I 
conducted as part of my PhD work. I will also explain how experimental trials were 
recorded and coded for the analyses described in chapters 3-5.  
 
 
2.1 – Subjects 
 
 The lemurs that participated in these experiments came from two sites: the 
Centre de Primatologie de l’Université Louis Pasteur in Strasbourg, France, and the 
Blackpool Zoo in Blackpool, England, United Kingdom. 
 
2.1.1 – Centre de Primatologie 
 
 At the Centre de Primatologie, subjects were four adult brown lemurs 
(Eulemur fulvus fulvus, Figure 2.1): Hyacinthe (Hy), a female, and her offspring 
Hutch (Hu), a male, and his sisters Honorine (Ho) and Hermine (He); and three adult 
black lemurs (Eulemur macaco macaco, Figure 2.2): Rousse (Ro), a female, her sister 
Rustine (Ru), and Philémon (Ph), an unrelated male. 
All subjects were born at the centre and each species was socially housed in an 
enclosure consisting of both an outdoor (8.0 X 2.9 X 2.6 m) and indoor (4.9 X 2.1 X  
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Figure 2.1 – Brown lemur (Eulemur fulvus fulvus), subjects Hutch (Hu; left) and Hermine (He; right) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Black lemur (Eulemur macaco macaco), subject Rousse (Ro) 
 
 
2.6 m) compartment furnished with tree trunks and shelters. A tunnel between these 
two sections could be closed in order to isolate subjects for testing. All lemurs had 
been trained to enter the inside compartment individually and had previously 
participated in several cognitive studies in this manner. In addition, the tunnel in the 
black lemur enclosure could be further divided into two separate chambers, and 
animals were trained to enter these areas individually as well. Except during test 
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sessions, lemurs were able to move freely between the outdoor and indoor areas and 
tunnels.  
During the course of my research, the brown lemur group also included an 
adult male named Haribo, who preferred not to participate in experiments and, sadly, 
died in early 2007. Also present was a juvenile female, Hevea (daughter of 
Hyacinthe), who was not yet comfortable interacting with experimenters on her own. 
The black lemur group also consisted of an adult female, Rebecca (mother to Rousse 
and Rustine), who also died in early 2007. Rousse gave birth to two females, Roxanne 
and Ratatouille, in the spring of 2007.  
The lemurs were provided with commercial primate pellets each day, and with 
fresh fruit and vegetables once a week. Water was available ad libitum, and lemurs 
were neither food- nor water-deprived for testing 
  Of particular interest is this group of lemurs’ previous training to indicate 
choices of stimuli by using an abbreviated reaching gesture, or ‘point’ (Genty et al., 
2004; Genty et al., 2008; Genty, personal communication). During training, the 
experimenter sat in front of the lemurs’ enclosure and presented the subject with a 
pivoting platform, in the middle of which was a pile of raisins, a preferred food. The 
subject was permitted to reach through the wire mesh of its enclosure to retrieve the 
raisins. After a few sessions, the experimenter moved the platform a bit further away 
from the enclosure. When the lemur extended its arm through the mesh to attempt to 
grab the raisins at this new distance, the lemur was unable to reach. After the subject 
extended its arm through the mesh, however, the experimenter rewarded its attempt 
by moving the platform closer to the enclosure so the subject could retrieve the 
reward. As the training went on, the experimenter moved the platform farther and 
farther away from the enclosure so that  
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Figure 2.3 – Pointing in lemurs. A still video image of Hutch (Hu) using a trained pointing gesture. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Red-fronted lemur (Eulemur fulvus rufus), subject Jack (Jk) 
 
lemurs could not even come close to reaching the raisins. The experimenter continued 
to reward subjects for extending their arm through the wire mesh, a behaviour that 
would have been futile otherwise. Genty (personal communication) reported that 
lemurs abbreviated their reaching over time by no longer fully extending their arms 
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nor positioning their hands in an attempt at grasping. Further, lemurs went on to use 
this abbreviated reach to select choices of stimuli in a variety of contexts, generalising 
the behaviour to a number of tests. An example of lemurs’ pointing is provided in 
Figure 2.3.   
 
2.1.2 – Blackpool Zoo 
 
At the Blackpool Zoo, subjects were three adult red-fronted lemurs (Eulemur 
fulvus rufus, Figure 2.4): Roxanne (Rx), a female; Scortcha (Sc), a female; and Jack 
(Jk), a male. Lemurs inhabited an enclosure consisting of an indoor (3.3 X 2.6 X 2 m) 
and outdoor (14.7 X 4.5 X 3.0 m) compartment, and were able to move freely 
between them at all times.  
Unfortunately, these animals were not trained to participate in cognitive 
studies and it was not possible to separate individuals for testing. Instead, I presented 
stimuli to subjects from the side of their home enclosure and discarded trials in which 
there were distractions from other individuals or zoo visitors (see chapter 4 for further 
information). 
This group of lemurs consisted of one more adult female, Gwendolyn, who did 
not participate in my experiment, and who gave birth to an infant in the experiment’s 
final weeks. 
The lemurs received a mixture of fruits, vegetables, seeds, and commercial 
primate chow twice a day. Water was available ad libitum, and animals were neither 
food- nor water-deprived for testing. 
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Information regarding the experiments in which subjects participated can be 
found in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 – Subject participation. This table lists all subjects that contributed to my dissertation, and 
indicates in which specific experiments subjects participated. 
 
Subject Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Name (Abbr.) Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 1 Exp 2 
Hyacinthe (Hy)   X X X X 
Hutch (Hu)   X X X X 
Honorine (Ho)   X X  X 
Hermine (He)   X X X X 
Rousse (Ro) X X X X  X 
Rustine (Ru) X X X X  X 
Philémon (Ph) X X     
Jack (Jk)     X  
Scortcha (Sc)     X  
Roxanne (Rx)     X  
 
 
2.2 – Video recording and coding 
 
 Each trial of every experiment was recorded using a Sony DCR-HC19E 
miniDV camcorder situated behind the experimenter. I uploaded these videos to a PC 
and analysed them at 0.08-second intervals using Microsoft Windows Movie Maker 
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version 2.1. During recording, I provided the date, subject name, and trial numbers in 
order to correctly match video with paper records detailing conditions run and any 
other important notes. As the video camera was always situated behind me, 
photographic stimuli were seen on video from the back only (chapter 5), and my 
attentional cues were not visible (chapter 4). As such, blind coding was possible. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
  Some plants use toxic substances, such as alkaloids, to defend themselves 
from potential consumers (Glander, 1982). While the concentration of alkaloids 
decreases as fruit ripens, making these items more palatable and safe to eat, not all 
plants provide clues to palatability through appearance (Prescott et al., 2005). There is 
great risk in individual sampling when noxious substances might be present and, 
given this potential cost, there should be a selective advantage for individuals able to 
use social cues to assess food quality (Fairbanks, 1975). 
 The experiments detailed in this chapter explore whether lemurs seek out and 
use social cues while feeding. In Experiment 1 I examined whether lemurs are able to 
modify their own behaviour toward food after having witnessed a conspecific reject 
food of the same kind. In Experiment 2 I presented lemurs with novel and familiar 
food items to determine whether they seek out social cues when presented with foods 
with which they have had no prior experience. 
  
 
3.1 – Experiment 1: Do lemurs automatically use information available 
from conspecifics? 
 
Benefiting from social foraging depends on successfully reading information-
bearing cues given by other group members, yet many of these cues do not seem to 
have been shaped by natural selection for a communicative purpose (Markl, 1985). 
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One example is a typical disgust expression, which an individual emits in reaction to 
sampling distasteful food. This reaction typically involves spitting out the distasteful 
food item and sticking out one’s tongue and, as this behaviour is found even in 
decerebrate rats, is considered to be a reflexive behaviour (Grill & Berridge, 1985; 
Snowdon & Boe, 2003). As a consequence, an animal producing a natural reaction 
also happens to provide potentially useful information to anyone observing it. Social 
referencing is one way social animals can take advantage of this information and 
involves two “defining components,” as described by Russell and colleagues (1997). 
Firstly, the individual seeking information must look at the individual providing the 
information, as well as at the object or event that needs to be evaluated. Secondly, 
emotional information must be gathered to determine whether the referent is positive 
or negative and, thereby, how to react to it.  
 Evidence that primates are able to use information provided by conspecifics 
regarding food palatability is mixed. Cotton-top tamarins were shown to socially learn 
an aversion to tuna, a preferred food, when it was made unpalatable by treating it with 
white pepper (Snowdon & Boe, 2003). In baseline trials, before adulterated tuna was 
introduced, all individuals regularly sampled tuna. In test trials in which tuna was 
adulterated, however, only a few members of each test group sampled the tuna. Those 
that did sample the tuna exhibited typical disgust reactions and also decreased the 
number of food calls they emitted. As pilot work revealed that monkeys could not 
gather information about the palatability of the adulterated tuna through olfaction or 
sight, it follows that members of the group that never sampled the adulterated tuna 
gathered some information from those that tasted the tuna first, and used this 
information to modify their own behaviour. It is unclear, however, whether tamarins 
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were responding to the visual disgust reaction of conspecifics, a decrease in food 
calls, their group members’ subsequent avoidance of the food, or some combination. 
Hikami (1991) explored whether witnessing a conspecific avoid a specific 
food has any effect on an observer’s feeding decisions. Japanese macaque mothers 
were made to be averse to their infants’ preferred food by a cyclophosphamide (a 
chemical that induces gastrointestinal illness) injection administered after 
consumption. As a result, these adults would avoid this food when presented with it. 
In the test phase, infants were allowed to feed with their mothers, and presented with 
a choice between their preferred food and another food. Two out of three infants 
tested decreased their preference of the previously preferred food after witnessing 
their mothers avoid it. These results, Hikami asserted, provided evidence that 
Japanese macaques are able to gather socially valuable information about food 
palatability. Hikami and colleagues (1990) provided further evidence that Japanese 
macaque infants are influenced by their mother’s food preferences in another study. 
Here they tested Japanese macaque mother-infant pairs to see whether social 
information could extinguish a conditioned food aversion. Infants were conditioned to 
be averse to two foods by a cyclophosphamide injection, and each infant’s mother 
was conditioned to be averse to only one of these foods. After the aversions were 
established, mothers and infants were put together in the same enclosure and 
presented with both foods. The mothers avoided only the food to which they were 
averse and readily consumed the food to which they were not averse, as was expected. 
After being exposed to their mothers’ behaviour, infants began to eat the food to 
which their mothers were not averse, despite having been averse to it themselves. 
Infants did maintain their aversion for the food to which their mothers were also 
averse, and therefore avoided. In other words, a conditioned aversion was 
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extinguished through witnessing the behaviour of a conspecific. The authors claimed 
that the results of these two studies were evidence of social transmission of food 
preferences. 
In a similar paradigm, while behavioural cues available from conspecifics 
helped unrelated common marmoset subjects to overcome a food aversion, a 
conditioned food aversion was not socially transmitted to naïve individuals (Queyras 
et al., 2000). To begin, the researchers determined that all subjects highly preferred 
food A to food B. The researchers then conditioned an aversion to preferred food A in 
some individuals by treating the food with a high concentration of salt. After this 
treatment, conditioned individuals showed a preference for food B and avoided food 
A. Next, conditioned and unconditioned individuals were allowed to feed together, 
and were presented with both foods, which were both now untreated. After the 
unconditioned monkeys reached for food A, the conditioned subjects began to eat it as 
well, reverting to their original food preference. When later presented with both foods 
in the absence of the unconditioned individuals, the conditioned subjects continued to 
eat food A. Months later, Queryas and her team conducted a control test to determine 
whether the extinction of subjects’ aversion occurred over time without social input, 
or if the social information provided by the unconditioned conspecifics was necessary. 
They reconditioned their subjects to be averse to food A, and re-presented them with a 
choice between foods A and B. They found that subjects did not return to preferring 
food A over time without social input, indicating that marmosets were able to gather 
social information about food palatability and use it to modify their own behaviour. 
However, it is worth noting that the unconditioned individuals did not use conditioned 
subjects’ avoidance of food A to modify their behaviour. It seems that information 
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about what foods were palatable was socially transferred, but not information about 
what foods were unpalatable. 
Free-ranging spider monkeys were also shown not to use social information to 
avoid foods that group members found to be distasteful (Fairbanks, 1975). Bread was 
dyed to mark it as unpalatable and then treated with one of four agents: quinine, hot 
pepper, salt, or ipecac emetic. The experimenter then placed these items, in addition 
to bread that was undyed and untreated, at a popular feeding site. Subjects showed 
clear signs of disgust, including vomiting, after sampling the marked food, and did not 
try the food again after one or two direct experiences. However, all subjects tried all 
foods available at least once, not taking into account the experiences of their 
conspecifics, and thereby showed no signs of observationally learning that the marked 
food was not safe to eat.  
In a study with captive mandrills, Jouventin and colleagues (1977) provided 
adult individuals with two types of banana. One type was cut into slices and then dyed 
red using a tasteless food colouring, and so remained palatable. A second type was cut 
into slices, dyed blue, and then treated with quinine to make the banana bitter. They 
allowed infant mandrills to witness the adults feed, without allowing the infants 
access to the food themselves. The adult mandrills avoided the blue banana and ate 
the red. Next, infants were given a tray containing both blue and red banana. Infant 
subjects successful avoided the blue slices, showing they learned something about the 
relative palatability of the two foods. But in a similar study with chacma baboons and 
vervet monkeys, Cambefort (1981) found that baboon observers preferred to taste the 
palatable food first, but also went on to taste the unpalatable food, providing them 
with direct experience on which to rely when making discriminations later, while 
vervet observers tasted both items indiscriminately. Unlike the mandrills, then, 
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chacma baboons and vervet monkeys seemed unable to use social information 
regarding food palatability. But unlike the experiment with mandrills, Cambefort’s 
study was conducted in a free-ranging context. 
Boinski & Fragaszy (1989) also reported a case in which free-ranging 
primates were unable to use social information when making foraging choices. They 
found that while wild infant squirrel monkeys sometimes avoided noxious prey with 
which they had previously witnessed other infants having difficulty, these instances 
were few. The researchers reported that infants mainly fed in the company of other 
inexperienced infants, rather than seeking out information from experienced adults, 
and that most of what infants learned about which foods were appropriate to eat was 
done so individually. 
 To be sure potential observers have witnessed pertinent social information in a 
natural context is near impossible given the distance between individuals and the 
presence of visual barriers (e.g. foliage) and distractions (Fairbanks, 1975). As a 
result, one cannot be certain whether a lack of learning is due to an inability to learn 
or merely a missed opportunity to see a conspecific accept or reject a food item. Jolly 
(1966) has contended that captive experimental set-ups are one way to effectively 
direct a subject’s attention to a desired object or action, allowing researchers to better 
explore cognitive abilities.  
Additionally, it has been suggested that social learning can only occur when a 
behaviour is performed, not when there is a lack of behaviour (Visalberghi & 
Fragaszy, 1996). Perhaps, then, noticing food avoidance is not sufficient to elicit a 
strong, reliable response in observers, but witnessing a rejection of food at close range 
would be (Visalberghi, 1994). Combined, these two factors – whether the observers 
actually observe, and the presence or absence of something to observe – might explain 
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some of the differences in experimental results. Perhaps Boinski and Fragaszy’s 
(1989) infant squirrel monkeys were too distracted by the environment to take much 
notice of their group member’s reactions with any reliability. Or maybe the 
demonstrator’s avoidance of food in Cambefort’s (1981) vervet monkeys was just not 
as salient as a disgust reaction, such as that found in Snowdon and Boe’s (2003) 
cotton-top tamarins, would have been. 
Given these possible contributing factors to the disparate results reported 
above, I aimed to design an experiment in which subjects had clear opportunity to 
witness social information, and in which the cues subjects would observe would be 
more salient than mere food avoidance. In the experiment that follows, I investigated 
whether lemurs were able to use social information about food palatability to modify 
their own behaviour toward familiar food items. To ensure subjects witnessed a 
conspecific’s reaction to unpalatable food, I tested individuals in pairs, indoors, and 
away from their social group. This arrangement both reduced distractions and brought 
each subject into close proximity to a feeding conspecific. I provided one individual 
of the pair (the Model) a portion of palatable or unpalatable food and allowed it to 
sample the food. Next, I presented the second individual (the Subject) with its own 
portion of food. In order to assess whether lemurs are able to use information 
provided by others, I measured subjects’ behaviour toward their own portion of food 
after they witnessed a conspecific accept food and also after they witnessed a 
conspecific reject food. 
 
3.1.1 – Method 
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Subjects 
 
Subjects were three black lemurs at the Centre de Primatologie: Philémon, 
Rousse, and Rustine, as described in Chapter 2. 
 
Testing chambers and apparatus 
 
The testing area consisted of two adjacent chambers separated by a sliding 
wire-mesh door. This set-up allowed a lemur in one chamber visual, auditory, and 
limited tactile access to an individual in the next chamber (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Experimental set-up. Subjects sat in adjacent testing chambers, separated by a wire mesh 
door. A platform was placed in front of the chambers so that half its length was in front of each 
chamber. 
 
 
These chambers were situated on top of a short concrete wall (approximately 
one meter in height) that extended past the front of the chambers, creating a 20cm-
wide shelf along the front of the chambers. A platform (60 X 18 X 25cm) was placed 
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here, flush against the front of the chambers. The front panels were also wire-mesh, 
which allowed lemurs to reach through and manipulate objects presented on the 
platform. 
 
Procedure 
 
For each trial, one lemur was seated in each of the two testing chambers, with 
the wire mesh door closed between them. The presentation platform was situated so 
that half of its length was in front of either side. I was seated in the front and centre of 
the two chambers and, as they were at a height of approximately one meter, I was able 
to remain out of the immediate view of the subjects. 
To begin each trial, I raised my hand, which held ten pieces of a familiar food, 
above the centre of the platform in order to attract individuals to the apparatus if they 
were not already seated there. I then placed the food in front of one individual 
(Model) and, after 15 sec had passed, I then reached up and placed ten pieces of food 
in front of the second individual (Subject). A trial ended 60 seconds after the Subject 
received its portion of food, at which point I removed any remaining food items. 
Four familiar foods (apple, peach, grape, and melon) were used in two types of 
trials: Baseline and Test trials (Table 3.1). In Baseline trials, both the Model and 
Subject received ten pieces each of the same unaltered food (e.g. unaltered apple). In 
Test trials, the Model received ten pieces of an altered familiar food (e.g. altered 
apple). Altered foods were soaked in tonic water for 24 hours to make them 
unpalatable, yet non-toxic and unchanged in visual appearance.  
To be sure that lemurs found the altered food to be unpalatable, I presented 
altered fruit to another group of black lemurs also at the Centre de Primatologie. This 
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group was composed of four adults (two males and two females) and, though highly 
habituated to human experimenters, were not trained to participate individually in 
cognitive experiments. I entered their home area, scattered the altered fruit on the 
ground, and allowed them to sample it. Upon tasting altered food items, lemurs stuck 
out their tongues, removed the food from their mouths, and then allowed the food to 
drop onto the ground. I felt these were clear signals that the lemurs found the altered 
food to be distasteful, and proceeded to prepare the food in this way for testing. 
As I was interested in determining whether the Model’s behaviour alone 
would change the Subject’s behaviour, I divided Test trials into two groups: True and 
False. In the True test trials, the Subject received ten pieces of the same altered food  
 
 
Table 3.1 – Trial types. Unaltered familiar foods were palatable, and altered familiar foods were 
soaked in tonic water to make them unpalatable, but indistinguishable by sight. 
 
Trial type Model receives… Subject receives… 
Baseline Unaltered Unaltered 
True Altered Altered 
False Altered Unaltered 
 
 
the Model had received 15 seconds earlier (e.g. altered apple). In this case, the Subject 
received true information about the food’s palatability. In order to be sure that the 
Subject’s behaviour was not affected by some cues inherent in the food itself, I also 
conducted False test trials in which the Subject received ten pieces of the same type of 
food (e.g. apple) the Model had received, but the unaltered version instead. In this 
case, the Subject received false information about the food’s palatability. 
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The experiment was designed so that each individual served both as Model 
and Subject in each possible dyad for each food in all conditions. Baseline trials of 
each type (e.g. Baseline trial using grape) were given to each Model-Subject 
combination once, resulting in each individual serving as Subject for a total of sixteen 
Baseline trials. To avoid habituation, each individual served as the Subject only once 
for each food in each of the two Test conditions (e.g. Rousse was Subject only once in 
a True test trial using apple). As such, each individual completed eight trials in each 
of the two Test conditions. Each dyad was given two trials each day so that each 
individual in a given pair was able to act as Model and Subject. As a result, each 
lemur participated in four trials per day: two as the Subject, and two as the Model. 
 
Analysis 
 
For each trial I recorded the Subject’s latency to food handling (defined as the 
time between the presentation of food and the first time the subject grasped the food). 
I predicted that if lemurs are able to use social information, then they should alter 
their behaviour accordingly in response to that information. Specifically, Subjects 
should exhibit increased latency to handling food in the Test condition.  
I also measured the Subject’s looking time, defined as the total time spent 
visually attending to the Model’s behaviour in the first 15 seconds of each trial, which 
was the period before the Subject received its own potion of food. This measure 
would determine whether lemurs found the behaviour of a conspecific that was 
feeding to be more salient than the behaviour of a conspecific that rejected food, or 
vice versa. Significantly different average looking times could affect subjects’ 
latency. If lemurs were distracted by the Model’s behaviour, their distraction, rather 
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than the information gathered by having observed the Model, might affect their 
latency to handling food. 
One True test trial for Philémon was removed from analysis due to external 
distractions, and one False test trial for Rustine was removed from analysis due to a 
video error. 
 In order to assess inter-observer reliability, an experimenter not associated 
with the study coded 20% of trials. Pearson’s correlations revealed a high level of 
agreement for both looking time (r=0.76, P<0.001) and latency to food handling 
(r=0.96, P<0.001). 
 
3.1.2 – Results 
 
Looking time 
 
 I measured each Subject’s looking time to explore whether Subjects spent 
more time looking at the Model in Baseline versus Test (True and False, combined) 
conditions to determine whether either the Model’s food acceptance or rejection was 
more salient to the observer. If so, lemurs might have been visually focused on the 
Model unequally between conditions. If lemurs were distracted by the Model’s 
behaviour in such a way, their distraction, rather than the information gathered, might 
affect their latency to handling food. I found no support for this possibility, as no 
Subject’s average looking time per trial was significantly different between conditions 
(Ph: independent t(29)=1.12, P=0.90; Ro: independent t(29)=0.78, P=0.44; Ru: 
independent t(29)=1.20; P=0.24; Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 – Average time spent looking at the Model. Before the Subject was presented with its own 
portion of food, the average amount of time it spent looking at the Model. Data is divided into trials in 
which the Model had untreated (palatable) or treated (unpalatable) food. Whiskers represent standard 
error of the mean. No significant differences were found. 
 
 
Latency to handling  
 
 Given the skewed nature of the data, I conducted non-parametric statistics 
(exact Mann-Whitney U) to compare each individual’s latency to handling the food 
between conditions. 
 I first compared latency to handling palatable and unpalatable food for each 
individual when serving as the Model (Figure 3.3). As a Model, a lemur had not seen 
any relevant social cues and, as such, it should not have exhibited any difference in its 
latency to handling palatable or unpalatable food unless it were responding to 
olfactory cues signalling the food had been altered. I found no significant differences 
(Ph: U=97.0, z=1.20, P=0.25; Ro: U=72.5, z=1.71, P=0.10; Ru: U=105.5, z=0.28, 
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Figure 3.3 – Latency to handling as model. For each individual, when serving as the Model, the time 
between the presentation of food and the act of handling food when that food was untreated (palatable) 
or treated (unpalatable). As the Model, the subject has no social information about food palatability. 
Bold lines represent the median latency, the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. 
Whiskers represent the range, while outliers are marked by circles and triangles. No significant 
differences were found. 
 
 
P=0.79), indicating that lemurs could not tell the difference between the unaltered and 
altered food until they were able to bring it to their face for sniffing or tasting. 
 To determine whether subjects behaved differently after seeing a conspecific 
accept or reject food, I compared each Subject’s latency to handling food in the 
Baseline and Test trials. All three subjects appear to exhibit increased latency in the 
Test condition (Figure 3.4), with a significant effect found for two out of three  
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Figure 3.4 – Latency to handling in Baseline and Test trials. For each subject, the time between the 
presentation of its portion of food and handling of the food in Baseline and Test trials. Bold lines 
represent the median latency, the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers 
represent the range, while outliers are marked by circles and triangles.  
Mann-Whitney U test: ** P<0.01,  *** P<0.001 
 
 
subjects (Ph: U=45.0, z=2.81, P=0.004; Ro: U=91.5, z=1.14, P=0.264; Ru: U=29.0, 
Z=3.63, P<0.001). 
 To confirm that lemurs’ behaviour was not a result of cues provided by the 
food itself, I also compared Subjects’ latency to handling food in the True and False 
test conditions. If lemurs could detect the quality of the food without gathering social 
information, then they should exhibit a decreased latency in False trials – in this case 
the Subject saw the Model reject unpalatable food, but went on to receive palatable  
Baseline 
 
Test 
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Figure 3.5 – Latency to handling in True and False test trials. For each subject, the time between 
presentation of its own portion of food and handling of that food in both True and False test trials. Bold 
lines represent the median latency, the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. 
Whiskers represent the range, while outliers are marked by circles and triangles. No significant 
differences were found. 
 
 
food for itself. This was not the case, as no subject’s latency was significantly lower  
in the False condition (Ph: U=11.0, z=1.98, P=0.054; Ro: U=19.0, z=1.40, P=0.20; 
Ru: U=25.0, z=0.35, P=0.78; Figure 3.5). 
 It is possible that lemurs exhibited decreased latency to handling food in Test 
trials simply as a result of response facilitation (Clayton 1978, Byrne 1994), rather 
than having gained information about food quality. As response facilitation increases 
the frequency of certain behaviour in one individual in the presence of others engaged 
in that behaviour, perhaps lemurs are not as motivated to eat when a nearby  
True 
 
False 
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Figure 3.6 – Latency to handling: Response facilitation? For each individual, the time between the 
presentation of its own portion of food and handling that food. The “modeling” data represent trials in 
which the individual acted as the Model, and was thereby in the presence of a conspecific that was not 
eating, as that individual had not yet received its own food. The “observing” data represent trials in 
which the individual acted as the Subject, and was thereby in the presence of a conspecific that was not 
eating because that individual had rejected its food. Bold lines represent the median latency, the 
boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the range, while outliers 
are marked by circles and triangles. Mann-Whitney U test: ** P=0.01,  *** P<0.001 
 
 
conspecific is not eating. To test this, I compared lemurs’ latency to handling when  
they received unpalatable food as a Model to when they, as Subjects, had just 
witnessed a Model receive unpalatable food. In the former case, a conspecific – the 
Subject – was present and not eating as it had not yet received its portion of food. In 
the latter case, a conspecific was also present and not eating, but the individual had 
witnessed that conspecific’s initial rejection of food. If lemurs’ decreased latency in 
Modeling 
 
Observing 
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Test trials as compared to Baseline trials is due to the mere presence of a conspecific 
that is not eating, then there should be no difference in latency to handling food 
between these two circumstances. I found that this was not the case, as lemurs 
exhibited significantly higher latency to handling when provided with social 
information about food palatability (Ph: U=30.0, z=3.58, P<0.001; Ro: U=52.0, 
z=2.51, P=0.01; Ru: U=25.5, z=3.76, P<0.001; Figure 3.6). 
 Although lemurs were slower to handle food after having seen a conspecific 
reject a food item of the same kind, all subjects did bring the food to their faces in all 
trials. After doing so, lemurs tossed the food aside without inserting it into their 
mouths if it was treated, or consumed it if it was untreated. As lemurs would 
frequently cover their muzzles with their hands in this process, sniffing and licking 
behaviour could not be reliably and systematically measured for cross-condition 
analyses. 
 
3.1.3 - Discussion 
 
Despite spending the same amount of time looking at a conspecific no matter 
what it was doing, two out of three lemurs’ feeding behaviour was influenced by what 
they saw. Subjects took longer to take food items presented to them after having seen 
a group member’s disgust reaction to, and later rejection of, that same food. However, 
subjects were not completely persuaded to avoid the food after seeing these reactions. 
In this study, I treated food with tonic water to make it distasteful for the Test 
condition. It is possible that this alteration was not enough to elicit a strong avoidance 
reaction in my Subjects, as the cost of trying the food was very low. Unlike studies 
using chemicals that induce gastro-intestinal illness, the greatest risk lemurs endured 
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in my experiment was an unpleasant taste, and it might be that lemurs would have 
modified their behaviour more clearly if the cost of error were higher.  
 Further, as I used foods with which subjects were familiar, the lemurs I 
studied had had years of experience of these foods being palatable. In a study with 
Japanese macaques (Matsuzawa & Hasegawa, 1983), researchers found that subjects 
became averse to novel foods treated with cyclophosphamide more quickly than they 
did to familiar foods treated with the same chemical. Later in the study, when 
extinction of the aversion was explored, subjects quickly resumed eating the familiar 
food while continuing to avoid the novel food. And in Fairbanks’ study with free-
ranging spider monkeys (1975), all subjects had previous experience with marked 
bread being safe, as they had been presented with dyed, but untreated, bread in pilot 
sessions. Perhaps, then, the monkeys’ previous experience hindered their ability to 
respond properly to group member’s disgust reactions in test sessions. These results 
suggest that a familiar food that has been made to be merely distasteful, as in my 
experiment, would be slow to elicit an avoidance response in subjects who have 
witnessed a group member experience these foods.  
 It is also possible that, since food was presented to subjects by a familiar 
human experimenter, lemurs were more inclined to sample the food. Japanese 
macaques are known to eagerly accept novel foods from people visiting the park in 
which they live (Wantabe, 1989), and free-ranging rhesus macaques were found to be 
more likely to sample novel foods given to them by human experimenters than novel 
foods encountered on their own (Johnson, 2000). In both cases, monkeys had 
extensive history of humans providing safe and palatable food, which seems to have 
developed into an expectation of the same. Perhaps this phenomenon is also at work 
in the current study. 
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 The salience of the model’s reaction might also play a role. Infant 
chimpanzees withdrew from a novel object more often when having received a fear 
message from a human caregiver (Russell et al., 1997), and monkeys developed a fear 
of snakes after observing a conspecific’s fear reaction toward a snake (Mineka et al., 
1984). In these cases, the social information provided was very effective in eliciting 
differential behavioural responses in subjects. Urgent vocal signals, body posture, 
facial expressions, and possibly frantic movements convey information in many 
domains, whereas the behaviour associated with refusing to eat distasteful food is less 
arousing and exists mainly in the visual domain alone. It has been suggested that 
visual cues on their own are not sufficient to result in social learning about food 
(Visalberghi & Addessi, 2001).  
Snowdon (2001) has argued that primates that are too sensitive to social cues 
risk missing out on a potentially valuable food resource. For example, while a 
particular food might be unpalatable at the time an observer witnesses a conspecific 
tasting, and then rejecting, it, that same food could be palatable later. If an observer is 
very sensitive to the information provided by its group member regarding that food’s 
palatability, it might never again sample the food, thereby missing out when it is safe 
to eat. This would limit the diet of that individual, which can be a costly result. The 
ability to respond to environmental change (e.g. fruit ripening) is critical to many 
primate species (Prescott et al., 2005). Perhaps, then, the lemurs in my experiment 
were correct in sampling the food despite the reactions of their group members. It 
could be beneficial to be willing to taste items while having the predisposition to 
discard those items if there is the slightest problem. This predisposition could be 
established through witnessing social cues, such as a disgust reaction. 
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It remains to be determined whether the behavioural differences found in my 
study are the result of information about the specific food in a given trial having been 
gathered, or whether Subjects’ behaviour is a result of the Model’s behaviour alone. 
Research with capuchin monkeys (Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000) showed that subjects 
ingested more food when in the presence of feeding conspecifics, even if they were 
eating different foods. This could be a result of a mechanism such as response 
facilitation (Byrne, 1994), a social effect in which witnessing a conspecific perform a 
specific action increases the probability an observer will perform the same action. If 
this type of mechanism is at play in foraging contexts, Visalberghi and Addessi 
(2000) contend that the result would be a very unsafe way to integrate foods into 
one’s diet. They argue that an observer could end up eating something nearby that is 
noxious because a conspecific in its view is eating a different food. King (1994) has 
pointed out, however, that foraging primates that are in close proximity to one another 
are likely to be feeding on the same food in natural conditions. Perhaps, then, a 
mechanism such as response facilitation is an adequate, although not perfect, one for a 
primate to use. 
It is possible that a conspecific’s rejection of food affects the attitudes of an 
observer that are not specific to that food, but equally result in appropriate 
behavioural responses. In other words, the negative reaction witnessed by an observer 
can possibly lead the observer to feel stress, affecting their behaviour generally. This 
behaviour change would not be specific to the food that the observer witnessed its 
group member eat, but it could lead the observer to avoid that food all the same. A 
similar possibility has been raised regarding emotional information provided by 
human mothers to their infants (Feinman, 1982). The non-specific effect of attitudes 
on behaviour (sometimes referred to as “emotional contagion,” (Feinman, 1982)) can 
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effectively yield emotional responsiveness without an observer drawing conclusions 
about a specific referent. However, it has been shown that human children do use 
specific information when deciding whether to eat novel foods (Addessi et al., 2005). 
Perhaps human and non-human primates, then, cope with social information using 
different cognitive mechanisms.  
By exploring latency to handling food, rather than using a gross measure such 
as whether or not subjects tasted food items, I found that visual cues do, in fact, affect 
an observer’s behaviour. It may be the contribution of other factors, such as prior 
experience, the source of the food, and salience of a conspecific’s cues that influence 
an observer to avoid a food completely rather than to proceed with caution. 
In this experiment I showed that lemurs are able to respond to information 
provided by a conspecific in a way that is beneficial. This can only attest, however, to 
their observational learning ability. Observational learning occurs when one 
individual observes another’s action and goes on to internalise what was observed 
(Bandura, 1986). This type of learning does not require conceptualising another 
individual as a carrier of information, as the learner simply profits from observing the 
relationship between another’s physical actions and the consequences of those 
actions. Learning occurs without having consulted the other individual as part of a 
purposeful search for information, and even without recognising that information has 
been obtained (Baldwin & Moses, 1996). Active information seeking stands in 
contrast to observational learning, as an individual that is able to actively gather 
information avoids relying on chance observations. Instead, this individual is able to 
recognise situations in which information is required and is able to alter its own 
behaviour in order to obtain it. In the next experiment I explored whether lemurs are 
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good information seekers by determining whether they visually refer to other 
individuals differently when they need information, as compared to when they do not. 
 
 
3.2 – Experiment 2: Do lemurs actively seek out information from 
conspecifics? 
 
Food neophobia, the hesitancy to eat novel foods (Barnett, 1963), is an 
effective way to avoid consuming potentially dangerous substances. It is also 
important, however, for generalist primate species to exploit new resources 
(Visalberghi, 1994; Galef & Giraldeau, 2001). Taken together, these two approaches 
seem irreconcilable: individuals of any generalist species in a risky environment 
should investigate, taste, and eventually incorporate novel foods into their diet, but 
should also be very cautious as there is a risk of ingesting noxious substances (Rozin, 
1977). As such, any behaviour that increases the probability of eating safe items 
should be favoured (Galef, 1993). 
One way in which generalist primates might manage to reconcile neophobia 
and neophilia is by trying novel foods in a social context. It would be beneficial to 
forage with others when confronted with an unfamiliar food source, as group 
members can provide valuable information about palatability (see Experiment 1). The 
presence of group members, then, may help an individual to overcome neophobia and 
thereby result in that individual sampling more items. When feeding on familiar food, 
however, it should not be necessary to gather information. As such, the presence or 
absence of group members should not affect an individual’s feeding patterns.  
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In a study with brown capuchins, subjects’ consumption of familiar food was 
not found to vary based on the presence or absence of conspecifics, but subjects were 
more likely to try unfamiliar foods in the presence of others than when alone 
(Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1995). In a similar study with common marmosets, Voelkl 
and colleagues (2006) explored the role of social contact on infants’ reaction to novel 
foods. In a 2X2 design, they presented infants with familiar and novel foods in the 
presence or absence of group members. They found that while infants readily 
approached, tasted, and consumed familiar foods irrespective of the presence of 
conspecifics, their behaviour toward novel food was markedly different. When alone, 
infants exhibited higher rates of exploratory behaviours (e.g. sniffing), and often 
refused to eat the food. If infants did consume novel food in this condition, it was in 
small amounts only. Conversely, when allowed to feed with group members, infants 
consumed more novel food and exhibited fewer exploratory behaviours.  
In another study with juvenile common marmosets, Vitale and Queyras (1997) 
found that subjects did not need to be feeding alongside conspecifics in order to 
overcome their neophobia. In their study, they reported that juveniles ate more novel 
food when merely allowed visual access to group members than when isolated from 
the group, but did not show the same difference in consumption when presented with 
familiar foods. Conversely, for human children the mere presence of others is not 
enough to help overcome food neophobia. Harper and Sanders (1975) found that 
children were more likely to eat new foods when an adult was also eating that food 
than when an adult just offered it to them.  
Fragazsy and colleagues (1997) have suggested that when primates seek 
information from others about novel foods, they should do so through actively 
approaching, and interacting with, others that are eating those foods. While these 
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methods would indeed be useful, they may not be the only ways in which primates 
gather information. On Koshima Island in Japan, Wantabe (1989) reported that the 
consumption of fish spread through a group of Japanese macaques in a manner 
suggesting social transmission of the behaviour. He noted, however, that there was 
little evidence the transmission occurred through means of close social interaction, 
and did not propose an alternative explanation. This study highlights the lack of 
experimental evidence we have about exactly how social influences on food choices 
occur. If not through close contact with an individual who is eating food, then how? 
Visually attending to others is one way in which primates can seek out and 
obtain information from conspecifics while not being in their immediate physical 
proximity. Some researchers have speculated that the ability to coordinate behaviour 
or benefit from another individual’s experience can be achieved through social 
monitoring in addition to direct interaction (Cambefort, 1981; Coussi-Korbel & 
Fragaszy, 1995). Russell and colleagues (1997) agreed, and suggested that visual 
attention data should be collected in studies exploring the effect of social context on 
primates’ behaviour toward novel foods. 
Studies exploring visual attention have supported the idea that primates 
observe others when presented with unfamiliar items. Field observations indicated 
that infant mantled howler monkeys attended to their mothers’ behaviour when 
encountering potentially novel leaves (Whitehead, 1986). Captive experiments 
revealed that young chimpanzee subjects looked to their mothers (Itakura, 1995) and 
human caregivers (Russell et al., 1997) more often when presented with novel toys. 
In a study conducted by Addessi and colleagues (2007), Goeldi’s monkey 
subjects were presented with novel foods while in a testing chamber adjacent to one in 
which group members were present. For each trial, group members were either 
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presented with food that was visually identical to the food the subject had, food that 
was visually different from the subject’s food, or no food at all. Subjects visually 
attended to group members more often when group members were eating food that 
looked the same as the subject’s own food than when group members were merely 
present and did not have any food. When group members were eating foods that were 
different than those the subject had, subjects did not visually attend to these 
individuals significantly more than when group members were present and without 
food. These results suggest that Goeldi’s monkeys are capable of varying their visual 
attention to others depending on the situational context, attending more when 
conspecifics can potentially provide useful information, and less when they cannot.
 Ueno and Matsuzawa (2005) found that infant chimpanzees paid more 
attention to their mothers when confronted with novel food items than familiar ones, 
and suggested that the congruence of novel items eventually consumed by both 
mothers and their infants in their study was largely the result of the infants’ propensity 
to visually refer to their mothers. Social referencing, they argue, is a method infant 
chimpanzees might use to cope with neophobia and thereby expand their food 
repertoire. 
The studies reviewed above show that simian primates might use social 
referencing as a way to cope with novel or otherwise ambiguous situations. By 
visually attending to other individuals, an observer can gather useful information 
when presented with unfamiliar items. But do prosimian primates also possess this 
skill? In the current experiment, I aimed to explore whether lemurs also seek out 
information from conspecifics using visual attention. The subjects were black lemurs, 
a species that has been shown to be food neophobic (Gosset & Roeder, 2001). I tested 
individuals in pairs, allowing only limited tactile contact with one another in order to 
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fully explore their use of visual attention during feeding. If lemurs seek out 
information from other individuals, they should exhibit a difference in visual attention 
toward conspecifics when presented with novel, as compared to familiar, food items. 
 
3.2.1 – Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were the three black lemurs that participated in Experiment 1: 
Philémon, Rousse, and Rustine. 
 
Testing chambers and apparatus 
 
The testing chambers and apparatus were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1 (Figure 3.1). 
 
Procedure 
 
For each trial, one lemur was seated in each of the two testing chambers, with 
the wire mesh door closed between them. The presentation platform was situated so 
that half of its length was in front of either chamber. I was seated in the front and 
centre of the two chambers and, as they were at a height of approximately one meter, I 
was able to remain out of the immediate view of the subjects. 
To begin each trial, I raised both my hands, each of which held ten pieces of 
the same food, above the centre of the platform to attract subjects to the apparatus. I 
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then moved my hands so that one was above either side of the platform and then 
simultaneously deposited the food items on each side. I then returned my hands to my 
lap, allowing subjects access to the food. I stopped each trial after 60 seconds and 
removed any remaining food. 
 
Two conditions were tested: 
 
Familiar – The food items used in the Familiar condition were ones the 
subjects received on a regular basis as part of their normal feeds. These were banana, 
carrot, and raisins. 
Novel – The food items used in the Novel condition were ones the subjects had 
never before encountered. To determine with which foods lemurs were unfamiliar, I 
spoke with the veterinary staff, the caretakers, and research staff about what foods 
lemurs were given throughout the year and what foods had been given as rewards in 
other experiments. I then compiled a list of foods I wished to use in the Novel 
condition, and checked with the aforementioned individuals once again to be certain 
that the lemurs had never before tasted these foods. The Novel foods chosen and 
verified were mango, kiwi, red pepper, yellow pepper, fig cereal bar, biscuit, 
cantaloupe, red gel candy, dried apricot, pineapple, green pepper, bread, orange gel 
candy, courgette, avocado, litchi, walnut, potato, Sharon fruit, raspberry, cucumber, 
mushroom, strawberry, and pomegranate.  
 
 When possible, foods were cut into pieces measuring approximately 1cm X 
1cm. Otherwise, foods were given whole (e.g. pomegranate seeds and raisins). Each 
novel food was used for one trial only to ensure familiarity was not established. 
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 Trials were given so that each pair of subjects was given sessions of two trials, 
one Familiar and one Novel, each day. Overall, each subject completed sixteen 
Familiar trials and sixteen Novel trials. 
 
Analysis 
 
For each trial, I recorded how many times subjects looked at the model during 
the course of the trial and how much time subjects spent looking at the model.  
One Novel food trial for the Ph-Ro dyad was removed from analysis due to a 
video error. 
 In order to assess inter-observer reliability, an experimenter not associated 
with the study coded 20% of trials. Pearson’s correlations revealed a high level of 
agreement for total looking time (r=0.69, P=0.001), number of individual looks 
(r=0.73, P<0.001), and length of individual looks (r=0.82, P<0.001). 
 
3.2.2 – Results 
 
Looking time 
 
 To explore whether subjects paid more attention to their testing partner when 
presented with novel foods than they did when presented with familiar foods, I 
compared, for each subject, the average time spent looking at the test partner per trial 
in each the Novel and Familiar conditions (Figure 3.7). One out of three subjects 
spent significantly more time looking at its test partner in the Novel condition than in 
the Familiar condition (Ro: independent t(29)=2.85, P=0.008), while one subject 
 49 
showed a trend in this direction (Ru: independent t(30)=1.74, P=0.09). The third 
subject did not show any significant difference between these conditions (Ph: 
independent t(29)=0.34, P=0.74). 
 
Length of looks 
 
 In addition to total time spent looking at a test partner during each trial, I also 
explored whether there was a difference in the way in which subjects looked (Figure 
3.8). For example, subjects could use a cursory monitoring strategy in which they 
make frequent, but brief, glances to their testing partner. Alternatively, subjects could 
make fewer looks toward their testing partner, but look for a longer period each time 
they do so. It has been argued that longer individual glances serve to allow an 
observer to extract more information about causal relationships, the consequences of 
actions, and other types of information that would be more difficult to gather by using 
a cursory monitoring strategy (Cohen, 1972; Range & Huber, 2007). Two out of three 
subjects employed the former strategy in the Novel condition, as compared to the 
Familiar condition. In other words, these individuals exhibited longer individual looks 
when confronted with novel food items than when given familiar food items (Ro: 
independent t(175)=7.44, P<0.001; Ru: independent t(118)=2.70, P=0.008). One 
subject did not show any significant difference in average length of individual looks 
(Ph: independent t(81)=0.32, P=0.75). 
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Figure 3.7 – Average time spent looking at testing partner. For each subject, the average time spent 
looking at its testing partner per trial in the Familiar and Novel conditions. Whiskers represent standard 
error of the mean. Independent t-test: ** P<0.01 
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Figure 3.8 – Average length of looks. For each subject, the average length of each individual look 
made toward its testing partner in the Familiar and in the Novel conditions. Whiskers represent the 
standard error of the mean. Independent t-test: ** P<0.01,  *** P<0.001 
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Individual differences 
 
 The subject who failed to exhibit any significant differences in behaviour 
between the two conditions in either of the above measures was Philémon. As such, I 
explored his looking behaviour further. Overall, Philémon looked at his test partner 
less often than the other two subjects, Rousse and Rustine, did. When comparing, 
between subjects, the percent of trials in which individuals looked to their test partner 
once only or not at all, I found that Philémon did so in significantly more trials than 
Rousse and Rustine did (26%, 3%, and 6% of trials, respectively; X²=7.82, df=2, 
P=0.02). 
 
 
3.2.3 – Discussion 
 
In the above experiment, only one lemur spent significantly more time looking 
at a testing partner when presented with novel or familiar foods, and one more 
showed a trend in the same direction. However, Cohen (1972) has pointed out that 
total looking time might not be the whole story when exploring visual attention, as 
divergent attentional mechanisms can result in the same total looking time. One of 
these is a cursory monitory strategy in which an observer makes frequent, but brief 
glances, toward an object or event of interest. Alternatively, an observer can look 
fewer total times, but spend a longer amount of time looking with each glance. Two 
subjects in my experiment exhibited the latter strategy in the Novel condition, as 
compared to the Familiar condition. Both attended to a conspecific for longer each 
time they looked when presented with novel foods. As subjects had their own portion 
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of the same novel food, this behavioural difference suggests that subjects may not be 
interested in the food alone, but instead in the information a conspecific can provide 
about it. Using longer individual looks can allow observers to witness longer 
sequences of actions and thereby extract more information about the consequences of 
those actions, and other types of information that would be more difficult to gather by 
using a cursory monitoring strategy (Cohen, 1972, Range & Huber, 2007). Similar 
effects have been found in keas (Range et al., In press), common marmosets (Range 
& Huber, 2007), and human children (Range et al., In press). 
One subject did not exhibit a change in looking behaviour between conditions: 
Philémon. Moreover, Philémon looked at his testing partner significantly fewer times 
overall when compared to the other two subjects. One possible explanation would be 
his status within the social group. Philémon is a male of a species that is characterized 
by agonistic female dominance (Fornasieri et al., 1993). As such, females supplant 
males at feeding sites (Fornasieri et al., 1993) and regularly initiate bouts of 
aggression, with little to no reconciliatory behaviour (Roeder et al., 2002). Males also 
do not compete with females for access to limited food resources (Roeder et al., 
2002). Further, females have been shown to affect male black lemurs’ performance in 
behavioural studies. In a task involving manipulating boxes in which food was 
hidden, males avoided proximity to female subjects and thereby remained at a 
distance from the experimental stimuli. As a result, males were never able to solve the 
manipulation task, either through a lack of opportunity to learn socially or a lack of 
contact with the box (Gosset & Roeder, 2000).  
Coussi-Korbel and Fragaszy (1995) suggest that competing attentional 
demands in an individual’s environment limit the amount of time that individual can 
spend looking at any one conspecific, event, or object. They argue that subordinate 
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squirrel monkeys, which live in large groups characterised by a hierarchical social 
organisation, would not be able to focus on any one individual for more than a few 
moments at a time due to frequent scanning of the environment, while high-ranking 
individuals would not have the same problem. Perhaps, then, Philémon’s subordinate 
social status affected his looking. 
As my study comprises only one male in my subject set, further study into this 
species needs to be done in order to determine whether Philémon’s performance 
would be typical of male black lemurs. Further, similar looking time measures should 
be used to test species with divergent social systems to determine whether social 
status is indeed a factor in visual attention strategies. 
 
 
3.3 – General Discussion 
  
Drapier and colleagues (2003) have argued that information obtained by 
observing the feeding behaviour of others is much more than the acquisition of visual 
information alone, as the taste of scraps left behind from a feeding individual provides 
very useful information. Fragaszy and colleagues (1997) have also suggested that 
information gathering with regards to food should occur through interaction with 
individuals already eating that food. In both Experiments 1 and 2, I gave subjects 
limited access to their testing partner in order to study their use of visual information 
when unable to utilise the information gathering methods discussed by the researchers 
above. The results obtained by using this paradigm show that lemurs are sensitive to 
information gathered by seeing a conspecific’s rejection of food (Experiment 1) and 
that lemurs also seek out information from conspecifics by employing different visual 
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attention strategies when presented with novel, as compared to familiar, foods 
(Experiment 2).  
While sniffing the food items a group member is consuming and tasting its 
leftovers are undoubtedly effective ways in which to gain information about food 
palatability, only those closest to that individual would be able to access these items 
and obtain this type of information. And, even then, there would be limited 
availability of these items, leaving most group members without an opportunity for 
contact due to competition. For group-living primates, then, the capacity to use visual 
attention to actively seek out and observe a group member’s behaviour, and then use 
the information obtained in modifying their own behaviour, can be key (Cambefort, 
1981; Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995; Russell et al., 1997). In this chapter I have 
shown that lemurs possess this capacity. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
  
In Experiment 2 of the previous chapter, I explored lemurs’ use of social 
referencing in a foraging situation involving novel food. In that study, lemurs 
employed differential looking strategies depending on the uncertainty of the situation: 
they directed longer individual glances toward a testing partner when presented with 
food with which they had no prior experience than when they were presented with 
familiar food. In the two experiments that follow in this chapter, I aimed to determine 
whether lemurs also look to others for information in ambiguous social circumstances.  
In Experiment 1, I investigated not only whether lemurs seek out social cues 
when presented with an ambiguous interaction, but also whether they use these social 
cues to modify their own actions, as measured through lemurs’ use of gaze alternation 
and a trained pointing gesture. In Experiment 2, I again explored whether social cues 
affect lemurs’ use of pointing in a paradigm more closely related to the conditions 
under which they were trained to use this behaviour. Before detailing the methods and 
results of these studies, I will begin by briefly reviewing literature that has explored 
this topic in non-human primates and human children. In this way I will arrive at the 
paradigms I ultimately chose as good ones to use with my lemur subjects. 
 
Gaze alternation and its role in social interactions 
 
Walden & Ogan (1988) suggest that an infant’s looking at a parent’s face 
could reveal that she understands the face as an important source of information. In 
their research group’s studies, the direction of infants’ looking was recorded after they 
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had been presented with novel toys. Infants aged between 6 and 40 months (Walden 
& Ogan, 1988; Walden & Baxter, 1989) all looked to their parents. However, an 
important difference in looking emerged: infants in the age groups of 13-23 months 
and 24-40 months looked to their parents’ faces more often than those in the 6-12 
month age group. These younger infants instead focused on any part of their parents’ 
bodies. The authors suggested that the older infants were attempting to gain 
information about the objects by seeking out social cues from their parents, while the 
younger infants were instead establishing the continued presence of their parents 
because they felt uneasy about the situation. Dickstein & Parke (1988) explored 
infants’ looking further and found that 11-month-old infants quickly alternated their 
gaze from an object of interest to a parent’s face. They argued that the temporal link 
between the two looks indicated the infants sought information from the adult about 
the object specifically. 
In a study with juvenile chimpanzees, Russell and colleagues (1997) examined 
whether subjects would alternate gaze between a novel object and a human caregiver, 
just as human infants do (Walden & Baxter, 1989; Dickstein & Parke, 1988). They 
found that all their chimpanzee subjects alternated gaze in a three-look sequence 
(object-caregiver-object) at least once, and 65% of subjects engaged in longer strings. 
These results suggest that chimpanzees, like human infants, engage in social 
referencing and use gaze alternation as a way to gather information about a novel 
object or event. This is not the only context, however, in which gaze alternation might 
occur. 
Chimpanzees have also been found to alternate gaze between a desired object 
and the face of a human experimenter while using pointing or begging gestures 
(Tomasello et al., 1985; Leavens et al., 1996; Krause & Fouts, 1997; Leavens & 
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Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 2004). Face-directed looks in the case of gestural 
communication might not serve as a way to evaluate an ambiguous situation, but 
instead a requester might look to another’s face simply to check if they are paying 
attention to their gesture. As a result, the requester may alter his behaviour 
accordingly (Bruner, 1975; Tomasello, 1995). I will discuss this topic more 
thoroughly in the next section. 
An additional, related, purpose of gaze alternation would be to establish 
mutual attention. Gómez (1991) has suggested that when one individual is requesting 
something of another, it is crucial for him to know if that other individual perceives 
his request. Attentional contact, Gómez argues, would be an indicator that the 
requester perceives that the helper perceives his gesture, resulting in effective 
communication and a fulfilled request.  
The use of gaze alternation during the use of requestive gestures, such as 
pointing and begging, has been studied in a variety of non-human primates. In a study 
with squirrel monkeys (Anderson et al., 2007), subjects were required to point toward 
one of two cups in order for a human experimenter to give them a piece of food 
hidden underneath. While pointing, subjects alternated glances between the food and 
the experimenter’s face quite rapidly. If the subjects were attempting to establish 
mutual attention, then they would have engaged in more gaze alternation or spent 
more time looking at the experimenter’s face when the experimenter was looking 
back at them. Although they frequently checked the face of the experimenter, 
monkeys did not alter their looking behaviour in response to changes in the attentional 
state of the experimenter. Perhaps, then, squirrel monkeys did not look to the 
experimenter’s face for mutual attention purposes. Instead, monkeys could have 
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referred to the experimenter’s face in anticipation of a cue that they were about to 
receive food. 
Another New World monkey, the capuchin, exhibited different behaviour in a 
similar study involving pointing. Hattori and colleagues (2007) reported that 
capuchins spent more time looking to an experimenter’s face when that experimenter 
was looking back at the subject, as compared to when the experimenter was looking 
elsewhere. Unlike the study Anderson and colleagues conducted with squirrel 
monkeys, Hattori and collaborators did not observe any of their capuchin subjects 
engage in gaze alternation between a desired food object and the experimenter’s face 
at any point in the study. The authors do admit, however, that these animals were 
observed to engage in gaze alternation spontaneously during normal feeds, and 
perhaps the artificial circumstances of the experiment (including the requirement to 
use a trained gesture) somehow affected their behaviour. Perhaps, then, it is best to 
explore gaze alternation under natural circumstances, rather than requiring subjects to 
use behaviours they have come to learn through extensive training. 
 In a study with children with and without autism, Phillips and colleagues 
(1992) predicted that children should look for social cues when an experimenter 
performed an anomalous action. In control trials, the experimenter presented subjects 
with a normal interaction in which he handed a toy to the child and allowed the child 
to take it. In test trials, however, the experimenter withdrew the toy just as the child 
reached for it, and kept it for 5 seconds before giving it to the child. The researchers 
scored whether the child looked to the experimenter’s face after receiving the toy in 
control trials and after it was taken away in test trials. They found that typical children 
looked to the experimenter’s face significantly more often in test trials than in control 
trials, and that children with autism not only failed to exhibit a difference in looking, 
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but also looked to the experimenter’s face less frequently overall than typical children 
did. While typical children instantly alternated their gaze from the toy to the 
experimenter’s face in test trials, children with autism remained focused on the toy 
itself, or sometimes looked to the experimenter’s hands. The researchers claim that 
referring to the experimenter’s face is an indication that the children without autism 
sought information about the experimenter’s goal or intentions. If they were most 
interested in a mechanistic explanation for the toy’s withdrawal, then they, too, should 
have focused on the toy or on the experimenter’s hands.  
This type of paradigm provides a simple way to explore face-directed looking 
in both verbal and non-verbal subjects, without needing to employ artificial factors 
such as a trained gesture. As such, Phillips and colleagues’ paradigm was also used 
with chimpanzees (Gómez, 1994), and the results showed that subjects reacted to the 
test condition like typical children did: chimpanzees also looked directly to the 
experimenter’s face upon the withdrawal of a reward.  
Gómez (1991; 2004) claimed that one indicator of social understanding is that 
an individual views others as subjects rather than as objects. In his observations of an 
infant gorilla, Gómez noticed that when the gorilla led an experimenter to a door that 
needed opening, she looked directly into the experimenter’s eyes and then alternated 
her gaze to the door and back to the experimenter’s eyes again. If the gorilla were 
looking for a simply mechanical solution to her problem, Gómez argues, then she 
should have instead looked to other parts of the experimenter’s body that were more 
directly related to the movements required to achieve the desired end, just as the 
children with autism in Phillips and colleagues’ study (1992) did. In fact, Gómez 
found that the gorilla did exactly that in another situation: when the gorilla used the 
human as a climbing apparatus to reach the doorknob on her own. In this case, she 
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looked at the experimenter’s body rather than his face. The difference in the gorilla’s 
looking in these two circumstances could reflect an understanding of other individuals 
(in this case, humans) as subjects, rather than objects only. 
A study with children with and without autism emerged from Gómez’s (1991) 
experience with the infant gorilla. In this study, Phillips and colleagues (1995) placed 
desirable toys on a shelf, out of reach of the children. The child’s first request for the 
toy, in whatever way this request occurred (e.g., verbal request, pointing) was 
ignored. Instead, the experimenter stood still and looked at the child’s face. Any 
subsequent attempt to involve the experimenter was complied with suitably. The 
researchers claimed that failing to respond to the child’s request would encourage the 
child to increase their effort to solve the problem, as previous research had showed 
that the likelihood of a child engaging in eye contact with an adult increases if that 
adult is initially unresponsive to the child (Bates et al., 1975). Phillips and colleagues 
found that children with autism engaged in significantly less eye contact and gaze 
alternation than typical children when reaching for or pointing toward the toy. It 
appeared that the typical children viewed the experimenter as a subject, but the 
children with autism did not. 
In treating other individuals as subjects, rather than objects, non-human 
primates and normal children alternate their gaze between another individual’s face 
and something of interest in the environment. Children with autism and primates 
attempting to achieve non-social means to an end do not exhibit the same pattern of 
face-directed looks. In the case of communication (as in the studies discussed above 
in which an individual needs help in achieving a desired end), face-directed looking 
may serve to provide information about the helper’s attentional state. If the helper is 
not attending to the observer, then it is possible the helper will not fulfil the request 
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for help. In the section that follows, I discuss previous research that has explored 
whether non-human primates are able to modify their behaviour according the 
attentional states of others.  
 
Tailoring behaviour to the attentional state of others 
 
 Manual gestures can only be effective when the recipient is able to perceive 
them (Bruner, 1975; Camaioni et al., 1976; Gómez, 1991). In order to engage 
appropriately in gestural communication, then, an individual should have an 
understanding of the attentional states of others, and should use gestures in a manner 
directly related to the attentional state of a recipient (Bruner, 1975; Tomasello, 1995). 
An individual should therefore gesture more when the recipient can see the gesture, 
and less (if at all) when the recipient cannot. 
 For example, Call and Tomasello (1994) showed that two orangutans gestured 
more often when a human experimenter was oriented toward them than when the 
experimenter’s back was turned. One of these subjects, a highly enculturated 
individual named Chantek, also gestured more often when the experimenter’s eyes 
were open than when the experimenter’s eyes were closed. And Poss and colleagues 
(2006) found that gorillas and orangutans gestured more often when an experimenter 
was present than absent, and when an experimenter was oriented toward than away 
from the subject. 
 In their landmark study, Povinelli & Eddy (1996b) examined whether 
chimpanzees would modify their use of a begging gesture depending on the 
attentional state of a human experimenter. Chimpanzees were presented with two 
experimenters in each trial: one who could see the chimpanzee and one who could 
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not. Several experimental conditions were achieved by employing various postures 
(e.g., full body oriented toward versus away from the subject, head turned toward or 
away from the subject) and props (e.g., a bucket held over or just to the side of the 
experimenter’s head, a blindfold covering the experimenter’s eyes or mouth). From 
the start of the experiment, chimpanzees reliably chose the experimenter who could 
see them in the body orientation condition, a result corroborated by Hostetter and 
colleagues (2001); they found that chimpanzees used more manual gestures when a 
human experimenter was oriented toward them than when an experimenter had his 
back turned. Similarly, Krause and Fouts (1997) reported that chimpanzees waited 
until a human experimenter turned around to face them before pointing. However, in 
the other conditions of Povinelli and Eddy’s study, chimpanzees chose randomly 
between experimenters. They reported that chimpanzees learned a “face rule” over 
time and, by the end of the experiment, they were thereby able to choose correctly in 
conditions where the presence of the experimenter’s face could be used as a 
discriminative cue. Further, some subjects even learned an “eye rule” and so, over 
time, chose correctly when the presence of eyes could be used as a discriminative cue. 
Reaux and colleagues (1999) replicated this study a few years later with the same 
subjects to see if age played a role in performance. Perhaps, they reasoned, sensitivity 
to attentional states improved with development. Once again, chimpanzees chose 
correctly when choosing between an experimenter whose body was oriented forward 
and one whose back was turned. Chimpanzees showed a weak preference only for 
choosing correctly on those conditions to which a “face rule” could be applied, but 
improved over the course of the experiment, as in the original study. 
Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) speculated that perhaps chimpanzees understand 
whether a human experimenter can or cannot see them, but are unable to use this 
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information in creating a gesture strategy. One important aspect of their study to 
consider, however, is that the experimenter to whom the chimpanzee should have 
gestured never looked directly at the chimpanzee’s face in an effort to establish 
attentional contact. Instead, the experimenter merely made herself more attentionally 
available than the other by facing forward instead of away, or by not having a bucket 
over her head (Gómez, 2005a). If mutual attention is a key aspect of successful 
gestural communication, as has been suggested (Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Gómez, 
1991; Desrochers et al., 1995; Leavens et al., 1996) then perhaps the choices 
presented to Povinelli and Eddy’s chimpanzees were simply ‘not good enough.’ In 
fact, in another test condition run by Povinelli and Eddy (1996b), chimpanzee subjects 
used more gestures when an experimenter was making direct eye contact than when 
no mutual attention was established. 
 The results obtained by Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) do not end the story, 
however, as data from other labs provide conflicting insight into primates’ 
understanding of attentional states. In a recent study by Bulloch and collaborators 
(2008), chimpanzees were tested using the same paradigm Povinelli and Eddy 
(1996b) used. However, the results obtained from their replication were different, as 
chimpanzees begged preferentially toward the experimenter who could see them right 
from the beginning of the experiment without having to learn this during the course of 
the experiment.  
Furthermore, in everyday interactions, chimpanzees have been found to use 
purely visual gestures only when the recipient is attending to them, and use tactile 
signals when the recipient is attending elsewhere (Tomasello et al., 1994). These 
authors claimed that chimpanzees were using their gestures in a flexible way 
depending on how their gestures would be received by another individual. Further 
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evidence to support this claim comes from a more recent study in which Liebal and 
colleagues (2004) also reported that chimpanzees use more visually based gestures 
when the recipient is already attending to them. But what information is actually 
gained by the varying body and head orientations with which an ape is confronted? Is 
it information about that individual’s attentional state, or some other behavioural cue? 
In a study with chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos, Kaminski and 
colleagues (2004) measured in what ways apes are sensitive to body and face 
orientation by systematically crossing these two cues so that either could be oriented 
toward or away from the subject, creating four test conditions. They then measured 
apes’ begging gestures in each condition and found that when the experimenter’s 
body was oriented toward the subject, the subject used more gestures when the 
experimenter’s face was also oriented toward the subject than when it was oriented 
away. However, when the experimenter’s body was oriented away, apes’ use of 
gestures did not change whether the experimenter’s face was oriented toward or away 
from the subject. The results from Kaminski and colleagues’ study stand in contrast to 
those of Povinelli and Eddy (1996b), as the subjects in Kaminski’s study 
differentiated between an experimenter with her face oriented toward or away from 
them right from the beginning of the experiment, and did not need to learn a “face 
rule.” However, apes’ sensitivity to face orientation was limited to those cases in 
which the experimenter’s body was oriented toward the subject, as they did not 
exhibit this sensitivity when the experimenter’s body was oriented away. But why 
would chimpanzees use face orientation correctly in one instance but not in the other? 
The researchers proposed that apes could reason about the two cues in different ways: 
perhaps body orientation indicates an observer’s likelihood to perform an action, but 
face orientation indicates an observer’s ‘perceptual access.’ As such, apes should 
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gesture when a human experimenter can see them and is likely to respond, but not 
when an experimenter can see them but is unlikely to respond. 
In addition to ape species, some monkeys have been studied to see whether 
they are also able to modify their behaviour based on the attentional states of a human 
experimenter. Hattori and colleagues (2007) found that capuchin monkeys were 
unable to do so. Although subjects spent more time looking at the face of an 
experimenter when the experimenter was looking at them, subjects did not point 
toward a food reward more often when the experimenter could see the gesture than 
when he could not. As capuchins did not engage in gaze alternation either (see 
previous section), the authors concluded that pointing lacked communicative function 
for capuchins and, instead, was strictly a result of training. 
In a study with rhesus macaques, a species of Old World monkey that is more 
closely related to humans than capuchins are, Flombaum and Santos (2005) used a 
paradigm similar to that of Povinelli and Eddy (1996b), but within a competitive 
context. In their experiment, subjects chose from which of two experimenters to steal 
a piece of food, rather than request a piece of food. As in Povinelli and Eddy’s study, 
one experimenter could see the subject while one could not, due to the use of varying 
body postures and barriers. The data revealed that, in all conditions, subjects 
spontaneously stole food from the experimenter who could not see them. One possible 
explanation for these results is the “evil eye” hypothesis described, and then tested 
for, in an experiment with chimpanzees by Hare and colleagues (2001). Under this 
hypothesis, a subordinate avoids any food that has been seen by a more dominant 
individual, even if the dominant individual cannot see it at that time, as if the item 
were marked as forbidden by the dominant’s gaze. Hare and colleagues found that the 
evil eye hypothesis did not apply to chimpanzees. Subordinate individuals readily 
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approached and took food a dominant individual had previously seen placed in one 
hiding spot, but had then been moved to a new location when the dominant individual 
could not see. If the food had been ‘tainted’ by the dominant’s gaze to begin with, the 
subordinate would not have approached the food at all. In the case of Santos and 
colleagues’ (2005) rhesus macaques, both human experimenters faced forward to 
begin the trial, and thereby saw the food. If the evil eye hypothesis were at work here, 
subjects should have chosen randomly between the experimenters no matter their 
attentional state seconds later, or would not have approached at all. This was not the 
case, as subjects did approach and preferred to steal from the experimenter who could 
not see them. 
While some studies report conflicting results, there is convincing evidence that 
apes and monkeys are able to recognise the attentional states of another individual and 
respond appropriately, especially given the right experimental conditions. It would be 
informative to integrate the two topics discussed above – face-directed looking and 
the modification of behaviour based on another individual’s attentional state – in one 
study. In this way we can properly explore how these two phenomena might interact 
and, as a result, obtain further insight into the role face-directed looking plays in 
primate behaviour. 
 
Gaze alternation use and attentional states 
 
Gaze alternation and other visual attention strategies associated with social 
referencing can serve many purposes. In ambiguous situations, visually referring to 
another individual can provide information useful in evaluating objects or events or in 
determining another individual’s intentions. Face-directed looking can also serve a 
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communicative function, as these looks can be an attempt to engage in mutual 
attention or can simply allow an individual to check whether another has seen its 
actions. As prosimian species have been overlooked in studies exploring this 
behaviour, it is unclear at what point in primate evolution the ability to use these 
looking strategies emerged. Is it a simian trait or is the origin much earlier, so 
including prosimian species? And does the ability to modify one’s behaviour based on 
what was observed extend to prosimian species as well? 
In order to explore whether lemurs use face-directed looking, I found the 
paradigm used by Phillips and colleagues (1992) to be a good starting point. This 
paradigm allowed me to ask whether lemurs check for social information when 
presented with an ambiguous interaction, and also provided an opportunity for 
modification to explore differential use of face-directed looking. I presented lemurs 
with three different types of test trials, in each of which I exhibited a different 
attentional state. In this way I was able to determine whether lemurs looked to my 
face for social information, and also explore how they used the information once they 
gathered it. If lemurs alternated their gaze differently according to my attentional 
state, it would provide clues as to the function of gaze alternation for these animals. In 
an unexpected development, lemurs used their trained pointing gesture in this context, 
a paradigm different from those in which they had used the gesture previously. As 
such, I was also able to measure whether their pointing also varied depending on my 
attentional state. 
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4.1 – Experiment 1: Teasing 
 
4.1.1 – Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were four brown lemurs (Hyacinthe, Hutch, Honorine, and Hermine) 
and two black lemurs (Rousse and Rustine) at the Centre de Primatologie, as 
described in Chapter 2. 
 
Procedure 
 
 I sat on the floor facing the subjects’ home enclosure and waited for the 
subject to position itself directly in front of me. I maintained a neutral expression 
while looking straight ahead and held a raisin close to my body at chest-level. To 
begin the trial, I extended my arm to bring the raisin to the subject’s mouth. In 
Baseline trials, I allowed the subject to consume the raisin and then returned my hand 
to the starting position. In Test trials, I retracted the reward just as the subject was 
about to eat it, returned my hand (which was still holding the raisin) to the starting 
position, and adopted one of three attentional states: 
 
Subject – I oriented my head and eyes toward the subject’s face. 
Object – I oriented my head and eyes toward the raisin I held in my hand. 
Away – I oriented my head and eyes up into the corner created by the wall and  
the wire mesh separating the room and the enclosure. 
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After five seconds, I extended my arm toward the subject and allowed it to consume 
the raisin. 
Sessions consisted of twenty trials, sixteen of which were Baseline trials, four 
of which were Test trials. Test trials were interspersed within sessions so that at least 
two Baseline trials occurred between them. Test trial types were administered 
randomly. Subjects completed twelve sessions each, giving sixteen trials in each of 
the test conditions. 
 
Behavioural analysis 
 
In their study, Phillips and colleagues (1992) recorded the number of trials in 
which children looked to the experimenter’s face and compared, between conditions, 
the number of individuals who did so in at least 50% of trials. I employed a stricter 
criterion for my experiment: instead of recording the number of trials in which 
subjects looked to my face at all, I recorded the number of trials in which subjects 
looked to my face first. For Test trials, this look was the first shift in attention after I 
took the raisin away. For Baseline trials, this look was the first shift in attention after I 
allowed them to take the raisin from me.  
I also coded video for how much time elapsed between the beginning of the 
trial and the subject’s first look to my face, recorded the total time subjects spent 
looking at my face during each trial, and recorded the length of each face-directed 
look. 
In addition, I noted the sequence of subject’s visual inspections throughout the 
course of each test trial in order to explore gaze alternation. Gaze alternation has been 
 70 
defined in different ways. In some studies, researchers have treated as behaviourally 
significant any sequences of two looks that were directed to an object of interest and 
then to another individual (or vice versa) (Russell et al., 1997; Leavens & Hopkins, 
1998; Leavens et al., 2004). However, other researchers (Klinnert, 1984; Sorce et al., 
1985; Anderson et al., 2007) instead focused only on sequences consisting of three 
looks between an object of interest and another individual (e.g., object – face – 
object). And yet other researchers explore gaze alternation, but do not provide criteria 
(Leavens et al., 1996; Hattori et al., 2007). I chose the most robust of these criteria, 
defining gaze alternation as a sequence of at least two looks (face – object or object – 
face, Figure 4.1), but I also took note of how many looks between the object (the 
raisin) and my face occurred before lemurs looked elsewhere. I called this number the 
length of the gaze alternation bout, and I analysed these data to see whether longer 
strings occurred, and whether bout length varied across conditions. In addition, I 
recorded the total number of gaze alternation bouts for each trial. I feel this approach 
satisfies both the competing approaches to gaze alternation analysis.  
During the course of the study, I noticed that subjects indicated toward the 
raisin I had withdrawn using a gesture they had been trained to use for indication in an 
unrelated context (hereafter: pointing; see Chapter 2). I decided to measure this 
behaviour across conditions. I recorded how many times subjects pointed and how 
much time elapsed between the beginning of the trial and subjects’ first point. I 
considered the beginning of a point to be when the lemur’s arm was extended through 
the wire mesh past the wrist. Further, just as Hattori et al (2007) had done, I did not 
require the arm to fully retract, but did require the subject to pull back its arm slightly, 
before coding a new point. The backward movement of the arm for more than two 
frames (0.16 seconds) indicated this distinction, and a new point was recorded as  
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Figure 4.1 – Gaze alternation example. Stills from a test trial with Rousse (Ro) exhibiting (from left to 
right) a look to my face, a look toward the raisin reward (‘object’), and another look to my face. 
 
 
having begun when the arm began forward motion once again. If lemurs understand 
the communicative nature of this trained gesture, then they should be sensitive to my 
attentional state and thereby indicate more often in the Subject condition, as that was 
when mutual attention was established, than in the Away and Object conditions, in 
which there was no mutual attention between the subject and me. Another possibility, 
however, is that lemurs understand that their gesture must be perceived in order to 
produce the desired outcome, without understanding the communicative function of 
attentional contact. In this case, lemurs should gesture more in the Subject and Object 
conditions, when their gesture could possibly have been seen, than in the Away 
condition, when it was impossible for me to see their gesture. 
 In order to assess inter-observer reliability, an experimenter not associated 
with the study coded 10% of trials (N=29). Pearson’s correlations revealed a high 
level of agreement for latency to looking at the experimenter’s face (r=0.78, P=0.01), 
time spent looking at the experimenter’s face (r=0.72, P=0.015), the length of gaze 
alternation bouts (r=0.68, P=0.02), the number of gaze alternation bouts (r=0.67, 
P<0.001), the latency to lemurs’ first points (r=1.00, P<0.001), and the number of 
points (r=1.00, P<0.001). 
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4.1.2 – Results 
 
Looking 
 
 If lemurs seek out social information when confronted with an ambiguous 
situation, they should first look to my face more often in the Test than in the Baseline 
condition. Six out of six subjects first looked to my face in at least 50% of trials in the 
Test condition, while only one out of six lemurs did so in the Baseline condition 
(Figure 4.2a). By using non-parametric analyses, with each subject’s percentage score 
as a data point, I found that all six subjects looked to my face at the trial start in a 
greater number of Test than Baseline trials (Wilcoxon signed ranks test; z= -2.20; 
P=0.028; Figure 4.2b).  
I went on to explore the latency to subjects’ first face-directed look in Baseline 
and Test trials. I predicted that lemurs should look to my face more quickly in Test 
trials (the ambiguous situation) than in Baseline trials (the unambiguous situation). 
Four out of six subjects did so (Mann-Whitney U; Hy: U=419.0, N1=48, N2=47, 
P<0.001; Hu: U=444.5, N1=48, N2=42, P<0.001; Ho: U=551.5, N1=48, N2=40, 
P=0.001; He: U=610.5, N1=48, N2=33, P=0.08; Ro: U=617.5, N1=48, N2=37, 
P=0.016; Ru: U=150.0, N1=28, N2=16, P=0.13; Figure 4.3). 
 Separating test trials into Subject, Away, and Object conditions, I analysed the 
total amount of time subjects spent looking at my face per trial in the Test condition, 
as well as the length of each face-directed look. If lemurs were engaging in mutual 
attention, they would look to my face longer in the Subject condition than in both the  
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Figure 4.2 – a) First look to face at trial start. The percent of trials in which each subject first looked to 
my face after the beginning of the trial in both the Baseline and Test condition. b) Using each subject’s 
percentage score as a data point, the percent of trials in which the group looked to my face first after 
the beginning of a trial in both the Baseline and Test conditions. Bold lines represent the median 
percentage, the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the range. 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test: * P<0.05 
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Figure 4.3 – Latency to look at face. The time between the beginning of a trial and each subject’s first 
look directed at my face in Baseline and Test trials. Bold lines represent the median latency; the 
boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the range, while outliers 
are marked by circles and triangles. Mann-Whitney U test - *** P≤0.001,  * P<0.05 
 
 
Away and Object conditions. If referring to my face served another purpose, such as 
simply monitoring my attention as a way to predict food delivery, then looking time 
would not differ across conditions. To ensure that any looking time differences were a 
result of my attentional state, I did not include trials in which subjects did not look to 
my face at all. Only one subject, Hyacinthe, showed a significant difference in total 
looking time (ANOVA; Hy: F=5.06, df=2, P=0.011; Hu: F=2.44, df=2, P=0.10; Ho: 
F=2.66, df=2, P=0.083, He: F=1.64, df=2, P=0.21; Ro: F=1.94, df=2, P=0.16; Figure 
4.4), and Tukey post-hoc tests conducted for that individual showed that she looked 
longer in the Subject than in the Object condition (Hy: P=0.010). As Rustine only 
Baseline 
 
Test 
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looked to my face once in the Away condition, no average for this condition could be 
calculated. I was able to compare average looking times for this individual in the 
Subject and Object conditions using a t-test and found that she looked at my face 
significantly longer in the Subject than in the Object condition (Ru: t=2.24, df=12, 
P=0.044). Two subjects, Hyacinthe and Honorine, exhibited a significant difference 
in the average length of face-directed looks across conditions (ANOVA; Hy: F=4.80, 
df=2, P=0.010; Hu: F=0.88, df=2, P=0.42; Ho: F=5.13, df=2, P=0.010; He: F=2.74, 
df=2, P=0.075; Ro: F=2.33, df=2, P=0.11; Figure 3.5). Tukey post-hoc tests showed 
that Hyacinthe’s individual looks were longer in the Subject than in the Object 
condition (Hy: P=0.008) and Honorine’s individual looks were longer in the Away 
than in the Object condition (Ho: P=0.007). Again, as Rustine exhibited only one 
face-directed look in the Away condition, no average for this condition could be 
calculated. I compared the average length of face-directed looks in the Subject and 
Object conditions using a t-test. I found that Rustine’s face-directed looks were longer 
in the Subject than in the Object condition (Ru: t=2.25, df=12, P=0.044). 
 With no strong pattern emerging in lemurs’ looking time, I went on to explore 
lemurs’ use of gaze alternation. All subjects engaged in gaze alternation in all 
conditions, but, when comparing the average number of gaze alternation bouts per 
trial, no clear patterns emerged. Only one subject, Rustine, showed a significant 
difference in its average number of gaze alternation bouts across conditions 
(ANOVA; Hy: F=0.30, df=2, P=0.74; Hu: F=0.81, df=2, P=0.45; Ho: F=1.81, df=2, 
P=0.18; He: F=1.88, df=2, P=0.16; Ro: F=3.03, df=2, P=0.058; Ru: F=4.21, df=2, 
P=0.02; Figure 4.6). Tukey post-hoc tests conducted for this subject revealed that she 
engaged in more gaze alternation in the Subject than in the Away condition (Ru: 
P=0.019). 
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Figure 4.4 – Time spent looking at face. For each subject, the average amount of time it spent looking 
at my face during the course of a trial in each of the three Test conditions. For Hy, Tukey post-hoc  
Test: ** P=0.01. For Ru, independent t-test: * P<0.05. 
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Figure 4.5 – Average length of face-directed looks. For each subject, the average amount of time spent 
looking at my face each time they looked in each of the three Test conditions. Tukey post-hoc test:  
** P<0.01. For Ru, independent t-test: * P<0.05 
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I went on to determine whether the length of gaze alternation bouts varied across test 
conditions. Only one subject engaged in different bout lengths across conditions 
(ANOVA; Hy: F=2.70, df=2, P=0.073; Hu: F=4.00, df=2, P=0.025; Ho: F=1.32, 
df=2, P=0.28; He: F=1.46, df=2, P=0.25; Ro: F=0.96, df=2, P=0.39; Figure 4.7) and 
Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that this subject exhibited longer sequences in the 
Subject than in the Object condition (Hu: P=0.027). As Rustine only engaged in one 
bout of gaze alternation in the Away condition, no average for this condition could be 
calculated. I went on to compare her behaviour in the Subject and Object conditions 
using a t-test, but she did not exhibit any difference in gaze alternation length between 
these conditions (Ru: t=0.62, df=11, P=0.55).   
 
Pointing 
  
 I analysed the occurrence of gestures between test conditions to see if lemurs’ 
use of their trained pointing gesture varied depending on my attentional state. Lemurs 
did not show any significant differences between conditions in the percent of trials in 
which they pointed (Chi-squared test: Hy: X²=0.17, df=2, P=0.92; Hu: X²=0.20, df=2, 
P=0.91; Ho: X²=1.53, df=2, P=0.47; He: X²=0.53, df=2, P=0.97; Ro: X²=1.08, df=2, 
P=0.58; Ru: X²=0.50, df=2, P=0.78; Figure 4.8). I also examined the average number 
of pointing gestures per trial, using a Kruskal-Wallis test given the skew of the data, 
and once again found no significant differences between conditions for any subject 
(Hy: H=4.51, df=2, P=0.11; Hu: H=0.25, df=2, P=0.88; Ho: H=2.57, df=2, P=0.28; 
He: H=0.86, df=2, P=0.65; Ro: H=1.15, df=2, P=0.56; Ru: H=0.73, df=2, P=0.69; 
Figure 4.9) 
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Figure 4.6 – Average number of gaze alternation bouts per trial for Experiment 1. Data presented by 
subject, separated into the three Test conditions. Whiskers represent standard error of the mean. Tukey 
post-hoc tests:  * P<0.05 
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Figure 4.7 – Average length of gaze alternation bouts for Experiment 1. The average number of looks 
occurring in each gaze alternation bout exhibited by each subject in each Test condition. Whiskers 
represent standard error of the mean. Tukey post-hoc tests: * P<0.05 
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I recorded each subject’s latency to first exhibit a pointing gesture in all trials to see if 
subjects used the gesture more quickly when I could see them. Trials in which lemurs 
did not point were not given a score and were removed from analysis. Given the 
skewed nature of the data, I conducted the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistic to 
compare latencies in each test condition. Five out of six subjects did not exhibit 
significant differences (Hy: H=2.87, df=2, P=0.24; Hu: H=0.94, df=2, P=0.62; Ho: 
H=3.32, df=2, P=0.19; Ro: H=0.88, df=2, P=0.64; Ru: H=2.78, df=2, P=0.25; Figure 
4.10). One subject, Hermine, did show a significant difference in latency (He: 
H=14.8, df=2, P=0.001), and Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that she was faster to 
point in the Subject condition than in both the Away condition (U=17.5, z=-3.30, 
P<0.001) and Object condition (U=20.0, z=-3.31, P<0.001). 
   
4.1.3 – Discussion 
 
Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) have argued that training a primate to point is no 
different than training that individual to perform some arbitrary behaviour (e.g., 
scratching its elbow) in order to receive a reward. As a result, the primate is unlikely 
to understand the communicative nature of the gesture. However, some primates 
spontaneously look to an experimenter’s face when using a trained gesture (Blaschke 
& Ettlinger, 1987; Gómez, 2005a), which is exactly what I found with lemurs in this 
experiment. Though they were trained to indicate choices of stimuli by abbreviated 
reaching, they were not trained to engage in gaze alternation with a human 
experimenter. Yet, all subjects did it. What, then, is the purpose of their gaze 
alternation?  
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Figure 4.8 – Gesture occurrence. Percent of trials, per condition, in which each subject pointed at least 
once. 
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Figure 4.9 – Number of pointing gestures per trial for Experiment 1. The average number of times 
each subject pointed per trial in each of the Test conditions. Bold lines represent the median number of 
points; the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the range, 
while outliers are marked by circles and triangles. No significant differences were found. 
Subject 
 
Away 
 
Object 
 81 
Hy Hu Ho He Ro Ru
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Latency to first point
Ti
m
e 
(se
c)
***
***
 
 
Figure 4.10 – Latency to first point. For each subject, the time between the beginning of the trial and 
the first pointing gesture exhibited in that trial in all three Test conditions. Bold lines represent the 
median latency; the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the 
range, while outliers are marked by circles and triangles. Mann-Whitney U test: *** P≤0.001 
 
 
Perhaps lemurs were seeking a social explanation to their problem (not 
receiving the raisin that they were about to get). If they sought a mechanical solution 
for the delay in receiving the raisin in the Test condition, they should have focused on 
my hand, or even my arm, without paying much attention to my face at all. This 
response would have been akin to that of Gómez’s gorilla when she pushed an 
experimenter toward a door and then used him as a climbing aid in order to reach the 
doorknob (1991) and to that of the children with autism in Phillips and colleagues’ 
study (1992), which used the paradigm from which my experiment was developed. 
Instead, I found that lemurs quickly looked to my face after the food was pulled away 
Subject 
 
Away 
 
Object 
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from them, and frequently referred to my face until the food was returned, just as the 
gorilla Gómez observed did later in her development, when she led the experimenter 
to the door instead of pushing him there, and as the typical children did in the 
experiment by Phillips and colleagues (1992). 
Despite lemurs’ decreased latency to looking at my face in the Test condition 
and their tendency to look to my face first more often in the Test condition than in the 
Baseline condition, their looking behaviour did not change according to what they 
saw. That is, their face-directed looking did not vary according to my attentional state. 
Though there are a few instances in which a subject engaged in significantly more 
gaze alternation or spent more time looking at my face when mutual attention was 
established and no instances in which subjects did so in the other conditions, there 
was no strong or clear pattern across conditions for any of the measures used.  
Gaze alternation is given great importance in the child development literature 
because a gesture is effective in the first place only if the recipient perceives it, and 
checking the face of the recipient could be an indication that the signaller understands 
something about the link between gestures and attention. Gómez (1991) interpreted 
the looks made to an experimenter’s face by a gorilla that wanted a door to be opened 
as checks to see whether the experimenter was attending to her actions. Gómez argued 
that, when an individual is making a request of another, it is essential for him to know 
if his request is being perceived by the potential helper, as perceiving is causally 
related to acting. Perhaps, then, the unclear pattern of gaze alternation occurrence 
between test conditions makes sense: when a request is being made, the requester 
must monitor whether the helper is attending until the request is fulfilled. However, 
despite lemurs’ frequent looks to my face, they did not modify their pointing based on 
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my attentional state. If lemurs looked to my face for attention checking, then there 
should have been behavioural differences based on what they found. 
Povinelli & Eddy (1994) suggested that gaze alternation, instead, might just be 
a pattern of looking between two objects that interest an individual greatly, rather than 
an indication that the individual understands attention. They do admit, however, that 
gaze alteration could also indicate an understanding that the face provides cues useful 
in behaviour prediction, in an animal that lacks understanding of mental states. In 
other words, lemurs could have checked my face for a cue that they were about to 
receive food or that I was keeping it for myself, rather than to check whether I was 
attending to them. These cues could include a threatening facial expression or putting 
the raisin into my mouth to eat it myself. 
While a look to the face of an observer during gesturing is often cited as one 
symptom of an intentionally communicative gesture (Bates, 1976; Camaioni et al., 
1976; Bates, 1979; Bruner, 1981; Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Gómez, 1991; Leavens 
et al., 1996; Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens & Hopkins, 1999), the lemurs did not 
modify their gesture use based on what they saw after looking at my face. Perhaps, 
though, factors unrelated to their socio-cognitive abilities were at play that affected 
lemurs’ use of their trained gesture. These individuals were trained to point to food 
placed onto a pivoting platform by a human experimenter, who would immediately 
rotate the platform toward the subject after it had pointed. The conditions of 
Experiment 1 were different to those in which lemurs were originally trained to point. 
Perhaps the distractive nature of a novel situation in which they’d never before used 
the gesture affected their ability to integrate properly their behaviour with the social 
information they had gathered by using gaze alternation. I decided, then, to conduct a 
second experiment more akin to the context in which the lemurs had been trained in 
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order to explore whether they would modify their use of pointing given my attentional 
state under more familiar conditions. 
 
 
4.2 – Experiment 2: Delayed reward 
 
 As subjects were trained to point to food items placed on a platform, I used 
this method to once again examine whether they would modify their gesture use 
according to my attentional state. The study conducted with children with and without 
autism by Phillips and colleagues (1995), in which an experimenter placed a toy out 
of reach of the subject and did not respond to his initial requests for the toy, provided 
a simple way to incorporate a familiar situation for the lemurs while allowing a way 
to induce attention-checking. The procedure used by Phillips and colleagues (1995), 
in which an experimenter is temporarily unresponsive to a subject, has become 
standard in testing non-human animals for gesture modification and spontaneous 
social attention (e.g. Call & Tomasello, 1994; Hostetter et al., 2001; Povinelli et al., 
2003; Kaminski et al., 2004; Xitco et al., 2004; Poss et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 
2007; Hattori et al., 2007). For the experiment that follows, I placed a raisin on a 
platform that was out of reach for the lemur subjects. When lemurs pointed to the 
raisin, I most often responded by moving the platform closer to the lemurs so they 
could retrieve the food reward. In test trials I delayed my response to their gesture and 
used these delays to take on varying attentional states. In this way, I was able to 
analyse lemurs’ use of pointing in a context more similar to that in which they were 
trained to use the behaviour. 
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4.2.1 – Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were the same individuals that participated in Experiment 1: four 
brown lemurs (Hyacinthe, Hutch, Honorine, and Hermine) and two black lemurs 
(Rousse and Rustine), as described in Chapter 2.  
 
Procedure 
 
A pivoting platform (70 X 16 X 25 cm) was situated in front of the wire mesh 
of the lemurs’ home enclosure so that a lemur could not reach the apparatus with a 
fully extended arm. I sat on the floor behind the platform and facing the enclosure and 
waited for the subject to position itself directly in front of me.  
I maintained a neutral expression while looking straight ahead and placed a 
raisin on one side of the platform. The subject then indicated toward the raisin, as all 
had been trained to do previously (see Chapter 2). In Test trials, I did not immediately 
respond to their gesture, and instead adopted one of three attentional states: 
 
Subject – I oriented my head and eyes toward the subject’s face. 
Object – I oriented my head and eyes toward the raisin on the platform. 
Away – I oriented my head and eyes up into the corner created by the wall and  
the wire mesh separating the room from the enclosure. 
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After five seconds, I pulled toward myself the side of the platform opposite to the 
raisin, which brought the side containing the raisin to the subject. As the platform was 
now rotated so that lemurs could easily grasp the raisin, they reached through the 
mesh and retrieved the reward. In between Test trials, I added several filler trials in 
which I immediately responded to subjects’ first point in order to prevent frustration 
and participation refusal.  
Sessions consisted of twenty trials, sixteen of which were filler trials, four of 
which were Test trials. Test trials were interspersed throughout the session so that at 
least two filler trials occurred between them. Test trial types were administered 
randomly. Each subject completed between eleven and twelve sessions (variation was 
due to participation differences), totaling between fourteen and sixteen trials in each 
of the test conditions. 
The predictions for this experiment were the same as those made in 
Experiment 1. If lemurs understand the importance of a recipient’s attentional state, 
they should gesture differentially between test conditions: gesturing more when I was 
attending to them and less when I was not. 
 
Behavioural analysis 
 
 As in Experiment 1, I analysed lemurs’ looking by recording the occurrence of 
gaze alternation as well as the length of individual gaze alternation bouts (see 
Experiment 1 Methods). 
In addition to the measures I used to explore pointing in Experiment 1 
(average number of points per trial and latency to lemurs’ first point after the trial 
began), I also measured the inter-gesture interval. This was the amount of time 
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between the end of one gesture and the beginning of the next, for all gestures in a 
trial. Lemurs might use gestures in quick succession when mutual attention is 
established or when I can see them, as the communicative effort would be effective. 
Or, lemurs might exhibit response waiting under these conditions, as one perceived 
gesture should be enough to elicit a response (Bruner, 1981; Tomasello et al., 1985). 
To asses inter-observer reliability a secondary coder not associated with the 
experiment analysed 10% of trials (N=25). Pearson’s correlations revealed a high 
level of agreement for the number of gaze alternation bouts (r=0.64, P=0.014), the 
length of gaze alternation bouts (r=0.65, P=0.02), the number of points (r=0.75, 
P=0.006), and the inter-point interval (r=0.69, P=0.018). 
 
4.2.2 - Results 
 
Looking 
 
As in Experiment 1, I analysed the average number of times per trial subjects 
engaged in gaze alternation. As in the previous experiment, all subjects engaged in 
gaze alternation. However, only two subjects exhibited a difference in the average 
number of gaze alternation bouts per trial across conditions (ANOVA; Hy: F=2.69, 
df=2, P=0.079; Hu: F=2.01, df=2, P=0.15; Ho: F=3.82, df=2, P=0.030; He: F=0.35, 
df=2, P=0.71; Ro: F=1.79, df=2, P=0.18; Ru: F=5.00, df=2, P=0.011; Figure 4.11). 
Tukey post-hoc comparisons show Honorine engaged in more bouts of gaze 
alternation per trial in the Subject condition than in the Object condition (Ho: 
P=0.023), while Rustine engaged in a greater number of gaze alternation bouts in the  
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Figure 4.11 – Average number of gaze alternation bouts per trial for Experiment 2. Data presented by 
subject, separated into the three Test conditions. Whiskers represent standard error of the mean. Tukey 
post-hoc tests:  * P<0.05 
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Figure 4.12 – Average length of gaze alternation bouts for Experiment 2. The average number of looks 
occurring in each gaze alternation bout exhibited by each subject in each Test condition. Whiskers 
represent standard error of the mean. Tukey post-hoc tests: * P<0.05 
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Figure 4.13 – Number of pointing gestures per trial for Experiment 2. The average number of times 
each subject pointed per trial in each of the Test conditions. Whiskers represent standard error of the 
mean. No significant differences were found. 
 
 
Away condition than both the Object (Ru: P=0.023) and the Subject (Ru: P=0.023) 
conditions. 
 I also calculated the average length of gaze alternation bouts for each subject 
in every condition. As Rustine engaged in gaze alternation in the Away condition 
only, cross-condition comparisons of bout length could not be made for her. Only one 
of the remaining five subjects exhibited a significant difference in length (ANOVA; 
Hy: F=0.80, df=2, P=0.45; Hu: F=1.33, df=2, P=0.27; Ho: F=2.23, df=2, p=0.13; He: 
F=3.48, df=2, P=0.044; Ro: F=1.022, df=2, P=0.37; Figure 4.12). Tukey post-hoc 
tests reveal that this individual’s gaze alternation bouts were longer in the Away 
condition than in the Object condition (He: P=0.048). 
 
Pointing 
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Figure 4.14 – Latency to second point. For each subject, the time between the end of the first pointing 
gesture used and the second for all three Test conditions. Bold lines represent the median latency; the 
boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the range, while outliers 
are marked by circles and triangles. No significant differences were found. 
 
To see whether subjects’ use of pointing varied depending on my attentional 
state, I compared the average number of points per trial between conditions for each 
individual. No subject exhibited a significant difference (ANOVA; Hy: F=0.27, df=2, 
P=0.77; Hu: F=1.11, df=2, P=0.34; Ho: F=1.29, df=2, P=0.29; He: F=0.92, df=2, 
P=0.41; Ro: F=0.41, df=2, P=0.66; Ru: F=0.33, df=2, P=0.72; Figure 4.13). 
 I also investigated whether there was a difference in how long lemurs waited 
before pointing for a second time by measuring the time between the end of the initial  
point, which started the trial, and the beginning of the next point. Trials in which 
lemurs did not point again were not given a score and were removed from analysis. 
These data were skewed, and so I performed non-parametric statistics. No significant 
differences were found for any subject (Kruskal-Wallis; Hy: H=1.28, df=2, P=0.53; 
Subject 
 
Away 
 
Object 
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Hu: H=0.23, df=2, P=0.89; Ho: H=3.85, df=2, P=0.15; He: H=0.93, df=2, P=0.63; 
Ro: H=0.82, df=2, P=0.67; Ru: H=4.60, df=2, P=0.10; Figure 4.14). I further 
explored how long lemurs waited before gesturing by comparing the inter-gesture 
interval for all gestures in each trial. This set of data includes not only the time 
between the first and second gestures, but also the time between the second and third, 
third and fourth, etc. Once again, no significant differences were found for any subject 
(Kruskal-Wallis; Hy: H=1.10, df=2, P=0.58; Hu: H=0.28, df=2, P=0.87; Ho: H=4.66, 
df=2, P=0.10; He: H=0.27, df=2, P=0.87; Ro: H=0.22, df=2, P=0.89; Ru: H=3.40, 
df=2, P=0.18; Figure 4.15). 
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Figure 4.15 – Time between points. For each subject, the average amount of time between the end of 
one point and the beginning of the next point for all points in a trial. Bold lines represent the median 
length of time; the boundaries of each box represent the inter-quartile range. Whiskers represent the 
range, while outliers are marked by circles and triangles. No significant differences were found. 
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4.2.3 – Discussion 
 
 Although their use of pointing in Experiment 1, a context different to that in 
which they were trained, was surprising and impressive, lemurs had failed to modify 
their use of pointing when I was not attending to them. I reasoned that perhaps since 
they were using the gesture in a new context, there were many distracting factors for 
the animals that could have affected their performance and added “noise” to the data. 
I chose, then, to examine their pointing in a paradigm more similar to that in which 
they were trained to point in order to see whether differential pointing would occur 
under more familiar conditions. However, lemurs did not alter their gesture use based 
on my attentional state in this experiment either. 
Many researchers have cited sensitivity to an observer’s attentional state as a 
requirement for intentional communication (Woodruff & Premack, 1979; Bruner, 
1981; Call & Tomasello, 1994; Tomasello et al., 1994; Leavens & Hopkins, 1999; 
Hostetter et al., 2001), as the signaller must understand that the gesture needs to be 
perceived by the observer in order to achieve the desired outcome. The results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that lemurs are unable to meet this requirement when 
using a trained pointing gesture to obtain food from a human observer. Lemurs 
gestured equally often whether I could see their gesture or not, rather than using the 
gesture more when I could perceive it. As such, they may not understand their trained 
gestures as communicative. 
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4.3 – General Discussion 
 
In their study with chimpanzees, Russell and colleagues (1997) found that 
subjects not only alternated gaze between a novel toy and a human caregiver’s face, 
but also did so in very long sequences. While all subjects engaged in gaze alternation 
bouts consisting of their minimum criterion of three looks, 65% of subjects exhibited 
bouts of more than three looks, with the observed maximum being eight looks. The 
lemurs in my experiments performed similarly in this regard. All subjects engaged in 
gaze alternation bouts consisting of three looks (despite my lower criterion of two 
looks), and all subjects exhibited bouts of more than three looks, with the observed 
maximum being a length of eleven looks. Squirrel monkeys have also been shown to 
engage in gaze alternation while pointing (Anderson et al., 2007), just as chimpanzees 
have (Tomasello et al., 1985; Leavens et al., 1996; Krause & Fouts, 1997; Russell et 
al., 1997; Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 2004). This led Anderson and 
colleagues (2007) to conclude that if pointing in monkeys is functionally different 
from pointing in apes, then it is not by way of gaze alternation. There must be other 
criteria, then, that make pointing in apes more ‘special.’ 
Sensitivity to attentional state is one sign of intentional communication 
(Woodruff & Premack, 1979; Bruner, 1981; Tomasello et al., 1994; Leavens & 
Hopkins, 1999; Hostetter et al., 2001). Apes modify their use of gestures depending 
on the attentional state of the recipient in both natural (Tomasello et al., 1994; Liebal 
et al., 2004) and experimental (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Krause & Fouts, 1997; 
Hostetter et al., 2001; Kaminski et al., 2004; Poss et al., 2006; Bulloch et al., 2008) 
conditions, but monkeys do not (Hattori et al., 2007). In the experiments described in 
this chapter, I found that lemurs are also unable to modify their use of a trained 
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pointing gesture, despite their frequent looks to my face and thereby ample 
opportunity to recognise my attentional state. However, lemurs have been reported to 
fail to visually co-orient with humans (Itakura, 1996; Anderson & Mitchell, 1999), 
and this may suggest that they are unable to recognise human attentional states at all, 
never mind whether they possess the capacity to appropriately modify their use of 
visual signals according to these attentional states. 
I did not present subjects with a front-back condition, and perhaps lemurs 
would modify their behaviour in response to a cue as gross as body orientation, as 
even non-primates are able to make this distinction (e.g. dolphins, Xitco et al., 2004). 
Even so, if lemurs were able to point differentially in response to body orientation, it 
would not imply that lemurs understand attention. Paradigms that require extensive 
training, as the lemurs were extensively trained to point, often result in cue 
discrimination rather than social understanding (Gómez, 1998). In such a case, 
lemurs’ differential pointing in an experiment using body orientation cues might be a 
result of cue discrimination, as they were trained to use the pointing gesture under 
conditions in which an experimenter was facing forward. Alternatively, a differential 
response could reflect an understanding that body orientation correlates with a 
disposition to provide food rewards, as has been found in apes (Kaminski et al., 
2004). 
It is worth noting that the cost of pointing in my experiments is minimal. 
Lemurs did not lose anything by pointing more than once when their first or second 
gestures were ineffective, and they received their food after just five seconds. Perhaps 
the combined influence of the extensive training of the gesture, and the fact that 
lemurs incurred no cost for pointing under the “wrong” conditions, meant that lemurs 
had no need to recognise the “right” ones. In an experiment in which the delay were 
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60 seconds, or even more, the cost of staying with the experimenter would be greater, 
as subjects could use that time to eat lower-quality food available in the enclosure, or 
approach the door separating the inside (testing) and outside (waiting) areas in order 
to vocalise to group members (this is one of the lemurs’ favourite activities). I 
speculate that under conditions of higher cost, lemurs might then use attentional cues 
to modify their behaviour. For example, lemurs might leave the experimenter more 
quickly when she is not attending than when she is. 
Gaze alternation and attentional state sensitivity, however, are not the only 
behaviours that suggest intentional communication. Persistence of pointing until the 
goal is reached (Bruner, 1981; Leavens & Hopkins, 1999; Cartmill & Byrne, 2007) 
and using pointing for a referent other than that for which it was trained (Call & 
Tomasello, 1994), such as pointing deceptively in the presence of a competitor 
(Woodruff & Premack, 1979; Anderson et al., 2001) are other behaviours that 
researchers have suggested would imply an animal’s behaviour is intentionally 
communicative. There is some evidence that these same lemurs can learn to point 
deceptively (black lemurs: Genty & Roeder, 2006; brown lemurs: Genty et al., 2008), 
but only one brown lemur (Hutch) learned to do so with any reliability. 
Intentional communication requires that a signaller understands others not as 
mere agents (as defined as entities able to generate their own movements), but as 
subjects. Baron-Cohen (1991) has argued, however, that protoimperative pointing 
(defined as requestive pointing, or pointing to use another individual to obtain an 
object (see also: Bates et al., 1979; Leavens & Hopkins, 1998)) does not require the 
attribution of mental states, as it can be managed by the use of behavioural cues and 
physical interactions alone. Perhaps lemurs are behaviourists in the context of these 
experiments, and do not recognise nor reason about the mental states of others. In 
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other words, they aimed only to change my behaviour through using their gesture, but 
did not understand that I must see the gesture in order for it to be effective. Their 
frequent looks to my face, then, could have served as a way to check for some 
behavioural cue that would provide information about my future behaviour 
(Tomasello & Call, 1997), and indicate whether I was about to provide food or not. 
For example, they could have been searching for a threatening gesture, or could have 
been looking to see if I was eating the food myself. In either case, lemurs’ use of gaze 
alternation might not differ depending on whether or not I could see them. Instead, 
alternating glances between the food reward and my face would be interpreted as 
focusing on the raisin and searching for information about whether they would obtain 
it. Checking to another individual’s face in order to predict that individual’s future 
behaviour is also part of social referencing (Phillips et al., 1992). And since this 
explanation does not involve an understanding that a gesture must be seen in order to 
be effective, lemurs’ pointing might not differ depending on my attentional state 
either. 
Recognising the attentional states of another individual and using this 
information to modify one’s own behaviour is an ability that is valuable not only to 
gestural communication, but also to other aspects of social living such as locating 
resources in the environment through gaze-following. This is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5* 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the value of recognising self-directed gaze, 
that is, recognising that another individual is looking at you. However, recognising 
when another individual is looking somewhere other than oneself and following the 
direction of that individual’s gaze, are also valuable skills (Anderson & Mitchell, 
1999). Following the gaze of others offers many opportunities for a social animal: to 
locate food sources, to detect predators, and to witness important social interactions 
(Emery, 2000; Zuberbühler, 2008). It also provides information helpful in predicting 
another individual’s behaviour (Seyama & Nagayama, 2005). For humans, visual co-
orientation is recognised as a crucial component of language and social learning 
(Bruner, 1983; Csibra & Gergely, 2006) and is also thought to be important in 
development of theory of mind (see Chapter 6), including the ability to deceive 
intentionally (Whiten & Byrne, 1988) and to attribute intentions to others (Santos & 
Hauser, 1999). 
While some researchers have speculated that lemurs might follow the gaze of 
conspecifics (Anderson & Mitchell, 1999), systematic evidence is very meagre for 
prosimian primates, just the species whose evolutionary history is key to 
understanding the phylogenetic pattern. In a recent study by Shepherd and Platt 
(2008) exploring visual orienting in ring-tailed lemurs, two male individuals were 
fitted with eye-tracking video cameras to be worn while engaging in everyday 
                                               
*
 The results of Experiment 2 and the details of  “gaze priming” (proposed in the General Discussion of 
this chapter) were recently published:  Ruiz, A., Gómez, J.C., Roeder, J-J, & Byrne, R.W. (In press) 
Gaze following and gaze priming in lemurs. Animal Cognition. DOI: 10.1007/s10071-008-0202-z 
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interactions and movements. Their data suggest that ring-tailed lemurs may engage in 
some co-orientation, but this issue remains to be experimentally tested and 
systematically investigated. This is the aim of this chapter. 
 
 
5.1 – Experiment 1: Do lemurs follow the gaze of conspecifics? 
 
Researchers tracing the evolution of visual co-orientation among primates 
have typically asked whether subjects were able to follow the line of gaze of a human 
experimenter. In these studies, the experimenter would stand in front of the subject 
and direct his attention to a location in the testing room using cues such as head 
orientation and eye gaze direction. Great apes (Itakura, 1996; Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996a; Tomasello et al., 1999; Tomasello et al., 2001; Brauer et al., 2005) and Old 
World monkeys (Anderson & Mitchell, 1999; Ferrari et al., 2000; Tomasello et al., 
2001; Goossens et al., 2008) have been shown able to follow human gaze, whereas 
prosimian primates have failed at this task (Itakura, 1996; Anderson & Mitchell, 
1999).  
Visual co-orientation with a conspecific may be more biologically salient and, 
thereby, a more valid test (Neiworth et al., 2002). Fewer studies have investigated 
following a conspecific’s gaze, but these have reported similar gaze-following 
abilities in a wider range of species. In a study with chimpanzees and four Old World 
monkey species, Tomasello and colleagues (1998) enticed one individual to look at an 
attractive piece of food and then measured the reaction of a second individual (the 
subject) who had been looking at that individual. They found that all five species they 
tested reliably followed the gaze of conspecifics. Cotton-top tamarins, a New World 
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monkey species, were also shown to follow the direction of attention of a group mate, 
but not of a familiar human experimenter (Neiworth et al., 2002). Burkart and Heschl 
(2007) found that another New World monkey, the common marmoset, also follows 
the gaze of conspecifics. 
Studies using live conspecifics models, however, present some methodological 
problems. Firstly, it can be difficult to be sure that the observer has not simply noticed 
the object of the other individual’s attention, independently of following the other 
individual’s gaze. In their study, Tomasello and colleagues (1998) overcame this 
problem by designing a control condition in which food was presented to the subject 
when it was alone, but not all studies incorporate such controls. Further, it is difficult 
to train a conspecific to direct the attention of another individual, in order to carry out 
more controlled tests (Neiworth et al., 2002; Horton & Caldwell, 2006), which limits 
the types of questions an experimenter can investigate using live conspecific models.  
One promising development in socio-cognitive research is the successful use 
of photographic stimuli. Tests exploring visual co-orientation using photographs 
instead of live models have shown that Old World monkeys (Lorincz et al., 1999; 
Scerif et al., 2004) and apes (Horton & Caldwell, 2006) can successfully follow the 
direction of a photographed conspecific’s visual attention. In these studies, subjects 
are presented with a static image of a conspecific, either on video screen or paper. 
This paradigm allows the experimenter to strictly control what cues are made 
available to the subject, in what specific direction the model is ‘attending’, and how 
much time the subject is exposed to the cue. These factors make possible more 
detailed analyses and a wider range of experimental questions.  
In addition, some non-primate species also show evidence of visual co-
orientation. Domestic dogs are able to follow the attentional cues of both humans and 
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members of their own species (Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Ittyerah & Gaunet, In press), 
as are ravens (Bugnyar et al., 2004), while goats’ skills are limited to following the 
gaze of conspecifics, and do not extend to humans (Kaminski et al., 2005). These 
results, given the apparent absence of gaze following in prosimians (Itakura, 1996; 
Anderson & Mitchell, 1999), raise the possibility that the cognitive skills allowing 
gaze following have evolved independently in different taxa. However, if instead gaze 
following were found in prosimians, then it would most likely be primitive in 
mammals, rather than derived independently in dogs, goats, and simians.  
 Before an individual can benefit from visual co-orientation, however, it must 
first recognise and utilise the correct cues to orientation. As the social environment of 
humans and other primates is a busy one, this may not be an easy task. Baron-Cohen 
(1994; 1995) proposed a mechanism called the eye-direction detector (EDD) that 
would achieve this task by detecting the presence of eyes in the environment and then 
determining the direction of visual attention using the position of the iris relative to 
the sclera. Baron-Cohen’s emphasis on eyes, however, is problematic. Firstly, 
information from another individual’s eyes may not always be available, as that 
individual may be too far away for the observer to see its eyes clearly, or its eyes may 
be occluded by shadow or other objects in the environment (Perrett et al., 1992; 
Emery, 2000). Secondly, although the eyes are a clear signal for humans due to the 
presence of a transparent conjunctiva and large white sclera, Kobayashi & Kohshima 
(1997) found, in their study of close to 100 species of primate, that this feature is 
unique in the primate order. As such, judgements about direction of visual attention 
based only on the eyes would be difficult for other species. 
 Neurophysiological evidence suggests that information from the eyes is not 
the only cue used by non-human primates. For example, there are neurons in the 
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macaque superior temporal sulcus that are sensitive to specific orientations of the 
body (Wachsmuth et al., 1994) and head (Perrett et al., 1991; Perrett et al., 1992). 
Further, there are individual cells that seem to respond to perceived direction of 
attention, e.g. looking downward. These neurons fire not only when subjects are 
presented with models whose eyes are pointed downward, but also when the model’s 
head or body pointed downward, in the absence of other cues (Perrett et al., 1992; 
Perrett & Emery, 1994). While the vast array of cues available for use in determining 
another individual’s direction of attention can be beneficial, because inferences can be 
made as long as at least one of these is available, problems could potentially arise 
when two or more of these cues present conflicting information (Seyama & 
Nagayama, 2005). 
 In light of this evidence, Perrett and Emery (1994) proposed a direction-of-
attention detector (DAD), which credits eye gaze as well as head and body orientation 
as cues used in determining another individual’s direction of attention. They suggest 
that this mechanism would work in such a way that information from different cues 
would be organised in a hierarchy. Information from the eyes would override 
information from the head, and information from the head would override information 
from the body, due to a network of inhibitory connections in cortex. As such, this 
system would not only allow for computation of attention direction when some cues 
are unavailable, but also when cues contradict one another. 
 In macaques, Lorincz and colleagues (1999) observed that subjects behaved in 
a way similar to that predicted by the DAD model. They presented monkeys with 
photographs of conspecifics directing their attention to a specific location. In one 
condition the model’s body and head were oriented in different directions, and in 
another condition the model’s head and eyes were oriented in different directions. 
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Subjects co-oriented with head rather than body direction in the first condition, and 
with eye rather than head direction in the second.  
Although there is strong evidence that Old World monkeys correctly follow 
head orientation when cues from body orientation provide conflicting information 
(Lorincz et al., 1999), it remains to be seen whether this capacity is also found in 
primates more distantly-related to humans: the prosimians. The purpose of this 
experiment, then, was two-fold. I aimed to determine experimentally whether lemurs 
are able to visually co-orient with conspecifics. Within the same paradigm I also 
aimed to explore what cues lemurs would use to do so. 
 
5.1.1 – Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were three brown lemurs (Hyacinthe, Hutch, and Hermine) at the 
Centre de Primatologie de l’Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg, France, and three 
red-fronted lemurs (Scortcha, Jack, and Roxanne) at the Blackpool Zoo in Blackpool, 
United Kingdom, as described in Chapter 2. 
 
Procedure 
 
 The experimental stimuli were full-colour photographs of a conspecific 
familiar to the subject but not participating in the present study (hereafter: model), 
looking to the left or to the right. In the Agreement condition, the model’s body and 
head were oriented toward the same direction (left or right). In the Disagreement 
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condition, the model’s body and head were oriented toward opposite directions (see 
Figure 5.1 for examples). Non-test stimuli (photographs of familiar outdoor scenes) 
were also presented in one-third of trials to prevent habituation. 
 
Centre de Primatologie: 
 
 I tested each lemur individually, administering daily sessions consisting of 
nine trials. I presented the stimuli to each subject from the side of the indoor 
enclosure. In order for a trial to begin, the subject had to be seated directly in front of 
and looking at the display apparatus (a simple platform upon which stimuli were 
stacked, facedown). I then lifted up the stimulus from the top of the pile and displayed  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Examples of test stimuli in the Agreement (head and body oriented in the same direction; 
top) and Disagreement (head and body oriented in different directions; bottom) conditions. 
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it to the subject. After five seconds, the trial ended, I placed the stimulus face down, 
and then removed that particular stimulus from the display apparatus.  
I placed stimuli on the display apparatus before testing commenced in pseudo-
random order (with no more than three consecutive trials of the same condition or in 
which the model was oriented in the same direction). As I remained behind the 
stimuli, I was blind to the stimulus being presented in any given trial and could 
thereby not unintentionally provide additional cues to the subject. 
 
Blackpool Zoo: 
  
 Each trial was conducted opportunistically from the side of the lemurs’ 
enclosure. In order for a trial to commence, the subject had to be near the viewing 
window and not engaged in any activity that would interrupt the trial or affect 
performance (e.g. foraging, grooming, eating). I drew the subject’s attention to the 
display apparatus (an easel upon which stimuli were presented) using novel objects 
and vocal signals. When the subject was looking at the apparatus, I revealed the 
stimulus by flipping back a piece of paper that was covering the photograph. After 
five seconds, the trial ended, the cover was replaced, and that particular stimulus was 
removed from the apparatus. 
 Stimuli were stacked on the display apparatus at the beginning of the day in a 
pseudorandom order (with no more than three consecutive trials of the same 
condition, or in which the model was oriented in the same direction). As I remained 
behind the stimuli, I was blind to the stimulus being presented in any given trial and 
could thereby not unintentionally provide additional cues to the subject. 
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 The length of test sessions ranged from one to five trials, due to subjects’ 
varying willingness to participate and the presence of the wide array of distractions in 
a zoo environment. 
 
Analysis 
  
Only looks that occurred directly after looking at the model, and within the 5 
second trial window, were included in analyses. I classified looks of an angle less than 
90 degrees from the model’s gaze as “target,” and looks of an angle less than 90 
 
Target Anti-targetModel
Elsewhere
 
Figure 5.2 – Coding criteria. Upon seeing the model, I coded subjects’ looks in the same direction as 
the model’s gaze as “target” (green), and looks in the direction opposite to the model’s gaze as “anti-
target” (red). Looks of an angle greater than 90 degrees from the model were recorded as “elsewhere” 
(yellow). Only looks that occurred directly after seeing the model were recorded. 
 
 106 
 
degrees from the direction opposite to the model’s gaze as “anti-target” (Figure 5.2). 
For each trial, I recorded the direction of the subject’s first inspection (target 
or anti-target) upon seeing the model of at least 80ms duration (as in Scerif et al., 
2004; Horton & Caldwell, 2006), and the time the subject spent looking in each of 
these directions. As video was filmed from behind the presentation, I was able to code 
each trial blindly. 
Trials were removed from analysis if subjects’ behaviour was affected by 
external stimuli, such as vocalisations from other animals and visitor distractions 
(e.g., subjects moved out of the testing area during the trial). 
 To assess inter-observer reliability, a second researcher not associated with the 
experiment coded 20% of trials. In determining the location of subjects’ first visual 
inspection upon seeing the model, 89.5% agreement was achieved (Cohen’s K=0.79, 
an “excellent” value (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986)). Pearson’s correlation also 
revealed a high level of agreement for the total time subjects spent looking in the 
target and anti-target directions (r=0.69, p<0.001). 
 
5.1.2 – Results 
 
First visual inspection 
 
To determine whether subjects co-oriented with the model, replicated 
goodness of fit tests (Sokal & Rohlf, 1995) for observed ratios of subjects’ first visual 
inspections (target to anti-target direction, null hypothesis 1:1) were run in both the 
Agreement and Disagreement conditions. Tests for heterogeneity were insignificant in 
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both conditions (Agreement: G=6.00, df=5, P=0.31; Disagreement: G=1.38, df=5, 
P=0.93), indicating that the data were homogenous across subjects and thereby 
allowed analysis at the group level. The outcome of those analyses was significant in  
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Figure 5.3 – Location of first visual inspection. The number of trials in which each subject looked to 
the target or anti-target locations directly after seeing the model for the first time for that trial. 
 
 
both conditions (Agreement: G= 9.96, df=1, P=0.002; Disagreement: G= 8.83, df=1, 
P=0.003), showing that lemurs first looked in the target direction significantly more 
often than they first looked in the anti-target direction (Figure 5.3). 
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Looking time 
 
 To explore whether subjects also spent more time looking in the same 
direction as the model, I compared the average time subjects spent looking in the 
target and anti-target directions for the duration of the trial (Figure 5.4). One-way  
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Figure 5.4 – Average looking time per trial. The average time per trial each subject spent looking in 
the target and anti-target directions directly after seeing the model. Tukey post-hoc tests : * P≤0.05 
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ANOVA tests were conducted for each subject and revealed significant differences in 
looking time for four out of six subjects (Hy: F=4.87, df=3, P=0.005; Hu: F=3.90, 
df=3, P=0.015; He: F=5.52, df=3, P=0.005; Jk: F=4.08, df=3, P=0.03; Rx: F=0.252, 
df=3, P=0.89; Sc: F=0.810, df=3, P=0.50).  
 Tukey post hoc comparisons were conducted for those subjects whose 
ANOVAs yielded significant results (Hy, Hu, He, and Jk). Three out of four subjects 
looked significantly longer in the target direction than in the anti-target direction in 
the Agreement condition (Hy: P=0.04; Hu: P=0.23; He: P=0.045; Jk: P=0.05), and 
two out of four subjects did so in the Disagreement condition, with one more subject 
approaching significance (Hy: P=0.06; Hu: P=0.04; He: P=0.03; Jk: P=0.98). 
These looking time differences also held in cross-condition analyses. Three out of 
four subjects looked significantly longer in the target direction in the Agreement 
condition than they looked in the anti-target direction in the Disagreement condition 
(Hy: P=0.02; Hu: P=0.19; He: P=0.03; Jk: P=0.05). Two out of four subjects looked 
significantly longer in the target direction in the Disagreement condition than they 
looked in the anti-target direction in the Agreement condition, with one more subject 
approaching significance (Hy: P=0.09; Hu: P=0.05; He: P=0.05; Jk: P=0.98). 
 Post hoc analyses also revealed that none of these four subjects looked 
significantly longer in the target direction in the Agreement or in the Disagreement 
conditions when they are compared to each other (Hy: P=1.0; Hu: P=0.89; He: P=1.0; 
Jk: P=0.10). Further, they did not look significantly longer in the anti-target direction 
in one condition than the other (Hy: P=0.98; Hu: P=1.0; He: P=1.0; Jk: P=1.0), 
indicating that neither condition was more or less effective than the other in eliciting a 
co-orientation response. 
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5.1.3 – Discussion 
 
 This study provides experimental evidence that two species of prosimian 
primate are able to follow the gaze of conspecifics. This contrasts with earlier 
negative findings with human models (Itakura, 1996; Anderson & Mitchell, 1999), 
thereby supporting the idea that more ecologically valid methods need to be used 
when possible in order to understand fully the abilities of non-human species (Hare, 
2001). This interpretation is further corroborated by the instances of co-orientation 
reported by Shepherd and Platt (2008) in free-ranging lemurs. 
Because some non-primate mammals show evidence of gaze following (Hare 
& Tomasello, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2005), evidence of the presence or absence of 
this skill in prosimian primates was needed to indicate whether this ability evolved 
independently in different mammalian taxa, or once in a single common ancestor. 
Prosimian data thus hold the key to the possibility that positive results in non-primate 
mammals (Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2005) are due to ancient 
adaptation instead of convergent evolution. The results of Experiment 1 provide 
experimental evidence that prosimians are indeed able to follow conspecific gaze as 
expressed through the orientation of head and eyes jointly, implying that this 
cognitive skill is, at the very least, primitive for all primates. I suggest, therefore, that 
gaze following might have evolved only once among mammals. The abilities of birds 
such as ravens (Bugnyar et al., 2004), however, may reflect independent evolution of 
the same skill, though further exploration into the abilities of non-mammal species is 
needed.  
Like Old World monkeys (Lorincz et al., 1999; Scerif et al., 2004) and apes 
(Horton & Caldwell, 2006), lemurs are able to co-orient with a static image of a 
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conspecific. This indicates that properties of the face are sufficient to elicit a gaze-
following response, without the presence of other cues, such as motion or 
vocalisations. 
In addition, these results show that, like macaques (Lorincz et al., 1999), 
lemurs are able to co-orient effectively when the visual cues available to them provide 
contradictory information. When following another individual’s direction of attention, 
lemurs were able correctly to use information provided by the orientation of the head, 
despite potentially contradictory information provided by the orientation of the body. 
Shepherd & Platt (2008) had suggested that this might be the case, based on 
observations of two free-ranging ring-tailed lemurs. My experiment provides 
controlled experimental evidence for this ability. 
 Some researchers have proposed that conflicting information might be a more 
salient cue to direction of attention than non-conflicting information. An incongruity 
of head and body orientation, for example, could imply that something has alerted that 
individual and caused it to rotate its head, whereas having one’s body, head, and eyes 
aligned is often a resting position (Jellema & Perrett, 2003). The idea of salience of 
implied motion has support from neurophysiological data that shows certain cells in 
macaque superior temporal sulcus fire upon seeing a static image that implies motion 
(Jellema & Perrett, 2003), an effect that was also found in human subjects (Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2000). More specifically, while a normal congruity effect has been shown 
in human subjects for the direction of head and eyes (Langton, 2000; Seyama & 
Nagayama, 2005), a reverse congruity effect has been shown for eye and body 
direction (Hietanen, 1999; Hietanen, 2002; Seyama & Nagayama, 2005), as well as 
head and body direction (Hietanen, 1999; Hietanen, 2002). That is, judgement of gaze 
direction was faster in human subjects when the eye and head cues of a model were in 
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agreement than in disagreement, but slower when eye or head cues were in agreement 
with body cues than when these were in disagreement. 
I found that the photographic stimuli in Experiment 1 were equally effective in 
eliciting visual co-orientation in lemurs, whether the conspecific model’s body and 
head were oriented in the same or opposite directions. That is, lemurs did not look 
more reliably, or spend more time looking in the target direction, in one condition 
rather than the other. So, despite the potentially confusing contradiction of cues in the 
condition where head and body were oriented in opposite directions or, alternatively, 
the potentially provocative nature of the conflicting cues, lemurs co-oriented with the 
model’s direction of attention just as effectively as they did when all cues were 
providing the same information. However, as reaction time was not one of the 
measures I examined in this experiment, I cannot directly compare these results to 
those reporting congruity effects in humans. Videos of each trial could be analysed for 
latency to co-orientation, but this would still fall short of the reaction time accuracy of 
the human data. 
The two subjects with no significant looking time effect in either condition, 
Roxanne and Scortcha, were both individuals at the Blackpool Zoo. As the nature of 
the study at this site involved conducting trials opportunistically, and given the high 
number of trials aborted due to the distractions associated with an uncontrolled zoo 
environment, these subjects received fewer trials than their Centre de Primatologie 
counterparts. This may have prevented any clear pattern in behaviour to emerge. It is 
worth noting, however, that the third individual at Blackpool zoo, Jack, did exhibit 
significant differences in some of the comparisons even though he completed as few 
trials as his group mates. 
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 It has been suggested that, as their visual acuity is not as high as that of 
simians, lemurs will be more likely to follow head orientation rather than eye gaze, as 
a primary signal of attention direction (Kay & Kirk, 2000). Further, there is evidence 
from work with other primates that cues from the eyes might not be given as great 
importance, as in humans. While there exist few studies that report non-human 
primates as able to spontaneously follow eye gaze direction (e.g. Lorincz et al., 1999), 
there are many that report the opposite. Capuchin monkeys have been shown to use 
head orientation instead of eye gaze direction when the two provide conflicting 
information (Vick & Anderson, 2000). Apes have been shown to follow head 
direction even when eyes are closed, though they did so more often when eyes were 
open, whereas human children were shown to rely more on eye gaze direction in the 
same paradigm (Tomasello et al., 2007). Human infants were also found to follow an 
adult’s direction of attention more often when eyes were open and not occluded 
(Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002).  
 To explain these findings, Tomasello and colleagues (2007) proposed the 
“cooperative-eye hypothesis.” They suggest that human-type eyes evolved in the 
context of pressures for enhanced communicative and cooperative abilities useful in 
mutualistic social interactions, such as joint attentional interactions. These types of 
interactions are collaborative activities around objects (Bard & Vauclair, 1984; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005), which require participants to monitor to what others 
are attending, including whether attention is being paid to their own actions, so as to 
coordinate more effectively (Tomasello et al., 2005). 
 However, relying on head orientation, rather than eye direction, might not put 
an individual in a completely disadvantageous position. It has been argued that the 
two cues are virtually equal as reliable indicators of another individual’s attention as 
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they are most often congruent (Corkum & Moore, 1995), especially since primate 
eyes are forward-facing (Moore & Corkum, 1994). Further, if eye direction 
information were not always easy to obtain, as in non-human primates, focusing on 
features that are easier to detect (e.g., head orientation) would be more efficient 
(Kaminski et al., 2004). 
The results of the current experiment show that lemurs rely on head 
orientation when presented with conflicting information from the body. While these 
data begin to support the direction-of-attention detector (DAD) model proposed by 
Perrett and Emery (1994), further work will be needed to explore whether lemurs are 
able to follow conspecific eye gaze, and also whether they are able to use body 
orientation in the absence of other cues. 
 
 
5.2 – Experiment 2: Do lemurs use conspecific gaze to locate food items? 
 
Despite all the evidence that non-human primates have visual co-orientation 
skills, individuals of the same species are often reported to be unable to use the 
information provided by others’ gaze for any practical purpose, such as locating a 
hidden object. The task generally used to assess use of gaze is the object-choice 
paradigm. In object-choice tasks, subjects must follow visual cues provided by an 
experimenter to choose one of two (or more) potential hiding places in which a food 
item has been placed. Evidence that any non-human primate possesses this ability has 
been inconsistent. Even though orangutans and gorillas follow human gaze (Itakura, 
1996; Brauer et al., 2005), they appear unable spontaneously to use the cues provided 
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in object-choice tasks, although some improvement with extensive training has been 
reported (Peignot & Anderson, 1999; Byrnit, 2004; Byrnit, In press).  
Chimpanzees have also been shown to co-orient with humans (Itakura, 1996; 
Povinelli & Eddy, 1996a; Tomasello et al., 1999; Tomasello et al., 2001; Brauer et al., 
2005), yet subjects typically fail to reliably select the correct location in the traditional 
task (Call et al., 2000; Hare & Tomasello, 2004), and only perform successfully under 
certain limited circumstances. These include having the experimenter approach and 
search the correct location before allowing the subject to choose (Itakura et al., 1999; 
Buttelmann et al., 2008) or presenting the task in a competitive context in which an 
“evil” experimenter, who always takes food from the subject, uses reaching as a cue 
to the correct location (Hare & Tomasello, 2004). While the success of these 
experiments provides important insight into the types of ways in which researchers 
should frame experimental questions, these do not provide evidence that subjects are 
routinely able to use visual attention to discover hidden resources.  
A study by Barth and colleagues (2005) revealed that chimpanzees were better 
at using visual attention when they were required to leave the testing area between 
trials, rather than remain for multi-trial blocks. Other researchers have found that 
accompanying gaze with vocalisations also seems to help chimpanzees choose 
correctly more often (Itakura et al., 1999; Call et al., 2000). Call and colleagues 
(1998) reasoned that the traditional object choice task is potentially confusing as the 
human providing the cues is looking at an inherently uninteresting overturned cup. 
They speculated that if the experimenter had visual access to the food item, while the 
chimpanzee did not, its performance might be enhanced. Their data support exactly 
that, as the chimpanzees chose correctly more often when food was hidden inside 
tubes or behind barriers, rather than underneath cups. 
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A recent study by Hauser and colleagues (2007) reported that rhesus macaques 
could use a conspecific-like communicative head gesture or a pointing gesture, both 
provided by a human experimenter, when choosing to search for a food reward in one 
of two boxes.  However, this paper also reported that rhesus failed to use human head 
orientation and eye gaze cues to solve the task, even though this species has been 
shown to follow human gaze cues in previous studies (Anderson & Mitchell, 1999; 
Ferrari et al., 2000; Tomasello et al., 2001). Possession of a valuable cognitive skill 
without the ability to use it for such an adaptive purpose as finding hidden food 
resources presents an evolutionary paradox, calling into question the functional 
(Schloegl et al., 2008) and adaptive (Gómez, 2005b) value of gaze following skills. 
One possible resolution of this paradox might be that gaze following has evolved for 
some other function than foraging and, in non-human primates, it remains dissociated 
from foraging capabilities. 
Some of these results, on the other hand, could reflect motivational rather than 
cognitive deficits (Tomasello et al., 1998). Simply, primates may be most interested in 
what other individuals of their own species are looking at and, as a result, might not 
reliably interpret human gaze as conveying information even when they automatically 
follow human gaze. The ability to recognise the informational content of human gaze 
might involve a re-routing of cognitive resources already in existence for conspecific 
communicative skills, in order to read human cues (Tschudin et al., 2001), or might 
require extensive contact with humans in order to enhance possible predispositions to 
attend to human cues (Scheumann & Call, 2004). In fact, the non-human primate 
subjects who tend to perform best on these tasks are those individuals that are highly 
enculturated (Itakura, 1996; Itakura & Tanaka, 1998; Agnetta et al., 2000; Call et al., 
2000; Vick et al., 2001), lending support to the latter proposal. Further, various 
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studies have shown that aquarium dolphins (Tschudin et al., 2001) and fur seals 
(Scheumann & Call, 2004), who spend their days with human trainers, and also 
domesticated dogs (Hare et al., 2002) are able to use human gaze cues in object 
choice tasks.  
Still, primates’ difficulty in solving the object-choice task may not mean they 
are incapable of applying a strategy involving gaze following at all, just that it does 
not appear spontaneously in the conditions of these types of paradigm (Anderson et 
al., 1996). The object-choice task is a tricky one in that the subject must figure out 
that the gaze cue being presented by the experimenter is relevant to the food search 
task with which it is confronted in the first place when, if seen as a problem-solving 
task, anything in the environment could be a clue (Call et al., 2000). It follows, then, 
that a good way to look at subjects’ performance in the object choice task is to also 
analyse how often they use gaze cues in the same study, and compare these data to 
choice performance in a trial-by-trial analysis. However, researchers using the object-
choice paradigm have not investigated subjects’ gaze-following responses along with 
subjects’ choices in each trial. 
 I therefore modified the traditional object-choice paradigm in order to study 
both gaze following and object choice within the same experiment. I predicted that by 
analysing these two measures in tandem I would be able to determine whether co-
orientation has any direct bearing on the evolution of attention understanding. If 
lemurs are able to co-orient but fail to incorporate this information in choosing a 
search location, this could suggest that gaze following evolved for another function 
altogether. A correlation between co-orientation and choice, however, would be 
testament to the evolutionarily adaptive value of gaze following, as a simple way of 
reading the attentional focus of others. 
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5.2.1 - Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were four brown lemurs (Hyacinthe, Hutch, Honorine, and Hermine) 
and two black lemurs (Rousse and Rustine), as described in Chapter 1. 
 
Training 
 
To accustom subjects to the experimental apparatus, I first gave subjects 
training sessions in which the location of the raisin was revealed before the subject 
made its choice. I presented each subject with a pivoting platform (70 X 16 X 25 cm), 
with a small opaque barrier on either end (15 X 8 cm), just as subjects would later 
experience in the test procedure. I placed both my hands behind the barriers, one 
behind each, while maintaining a neutral expression and looking straight ahead, and 
surreptitiously deposited a raisin behind only one. During these training sessions I 
lifted the barriers to reveal the raisin’s location and then replaced them. The subject 
was then allowed to indicate one barrier to be removed by extending its arm toward 
one or the other barrier. I lifted the chosen barrier and rotated toward the subject its 
chosen side of the platform, allowing the subject to retrieve the raisin or to see that no 
raisin was available. In order to train subjects to attend to the full presentation, a trial 
was aborted and no reward was given if subjects reached before presentation was 
complete. 
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Training sessions consisted of ten trials, and each subject was permitted to 
complete one session per day. The location in which the raisin was hidden was 
pseudo-randomized so that five trials in a session were to the right, and five were to 
the left, with the raisin hidden in the same location in no more than three consecutive 
trials. Aborted trials were given again at the end of the session in order to maintain 
this balance. When a subject performed at 80% correct for two consecutive sessions, 
it was switched to the test procedure for subsequent trials. 
 
Testing 
 
The test procedure was similar to the training phase, except that I did not first 
lift the barriers to reveal the correct choice. Instead, I placed a full-color photo (15 X 
15 cm) of the adult male of the group, with head and eyes oriented to the right or to 
the left, in the centre of the platform (Figure 5.5). The apparent gaze of this 
photographic model was always oriented to the barrier behind which I had placed a 
raisin at the start of the trial. The subject was then permitted to indicate one or other 
barrier. I lifted the selected barrier, revealing a raisin if the subject had chosen 
correctly or no raisin if the subject had chosen incorrectly. In either case, the indicated 
side of the platform was rotated toward the subject, allowing retrieval of the reward or 
showing the subject that no reward was available. I then reoriented the platform to its 
starting position and removed the model. The next trial began after the subject had 
consumed its reward (if it had chosen correctly), and only when the subject was 
sitting attentively in front of the apparatus, equidistant from each end. 
  As in the training phase, a trial was aborted and no reward was given if the 
subject did not attend to the full presentation before reaching. Also, trials in which  
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Figure 5.5 – Apparatus and experimental stimuli. A representation of the apparatus and stimuli 
presented to brown (top) and black (bottom) lemur subjects. An opaque barrier was sited on either end 
of a pivoting platform. After surreptitiously depositing a raisin behind only one, I placed in the centre 
of the platform a photograph of a known conspecific whose head and eyes were oriented towards the 
baited barrier. 
 
 
subjects were distracted by outside stimuli (e.g., the vocalizations of other animals) 
were aborted during testing and given again at the end of the session. 
Test sessions consisted of ten trials, and each subject was permitted to 
complete one session per day. As some individuals were more willing to participate 
than others, the number of trials completed for each individual differs, with the 
number of sessions per individual ranging from 14 to 21.  
The direction in which the model was looking in a given trial was pseudo-
randomized so that five trials in a session were to the right, and five were to the left, 
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with no more than three consecutive trials cueing the same direction. Before each 
session, a sliced raisin was rubbed on either side of the platform to ensure that lemurs 
could not use olfactory cues to locate the food reward.  
 
Analysis 
 
 For each trial, I recorded the direction of the subject’s first inspection upon 
seeing the model of at least 80ms duration (as in Scerif et al., 2004; Horton & 
Caldwell, 2006), and the subject’s subsequent choice of barrier. 
 To assess inter-observer reliability, a researcher unassociated with the project 
coded 5% of trials. In judging the lemurs’ choices, the secondary coder and I agreed 
on 100% of these trials (Cohen’s K = 1). In judging the location of the subject’s first 
visual inspection, we agreed on 94.6% of trials (Cohen’s K = 0.89, an “excellent” 
value (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986)). 
 
5.2.2 – Results 
 
Visual co-orientation 
 
Videos of each trial were coded for the location of subjects’ first visual 
inspection. If lemurs are able to follow gaze, they should look towards the same 
location as the model. As in Experiment 1, I found that this was the case. Upon seeing 
the model, all subjects were significantly more likely to look at the barrier on the side 
to which the model was attending than to look at the other barrier (Binomial 
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probability, one-tailed: Hy, Hu, Ho: P<0.001, He: P=0.043, Ro: P=0.016, Ru: 
P=0.002; Figure 5.6).  
 
Object-choice 
 
Because the lemurs did not always follow gaze, and because they did not 
always act upon the first target their gaze fell upon, their overall pattern of choices 
superficially appeared to be random. Indeed, if analyzed simply for each individual’s 
performance in object-choice, the data would resemble those chance performances 
reported by other object-choice experiments, with the lemurs’ success ranging 
anywhere from 10% to 100% in a given session, and each subject’s overall 
performance at chance levels (mean 53.8%, SD ± 16.8%).  However, overall 
performance was not below 50% for any subject (Figure 5.7). In other words, 
although subjects did not appear to solve the task, all six seemed to be choosing 
correctly slightly more often than chance. As such, I continued analysis by using a 
replicated goodness of fit test (Sokal & Rohlf, 1995) for observed ratios of correct to 
incorrect choices (null hypothesis 1:1). A test for heterogeneity showed that the data 
were homogeneous (G=1.39, df=5, P=0.93), allowing me to conduct analysis on the 
pooled data. The outcome of this test was significant (G=6.78, df=1, P=0.009), 
meaning that, even though no subject did so individually, as a group subjects chose 
the correct search location more often than they did the incorrect search location. 
To assess whether lemurs were learning over the course of the study, I 
examined each subject’s performance using trend analyses (Sheskin, 2004). Five 
subjects did not show any significant upward trend across sessions (Hy: t=0.48,  
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Figure 5.6 – Location of first visual inspection. Trials in which the subject first looked to the same 
location as the model (“target”) and trials in which the subject first looked to the location opposite to 
that of the model’s gaze (“anti-target”). Binomial probability: * P<0.05,  ** P<0.01 
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Figure 5.7 – Overall choice performance. Percent of trials in which each subject chose the correct 
search location (the barrier to which the photographic model was attending). 
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df=21, P=0.64; Hu: t=0.37, df=17, P=0.72; He: t=1.79, df=13, P=0.10; Ro: t=1.52, 
df=20, P=0.15; Ru: t=0.93, df=20, P=0.36), while one subject’s performance did 
improve (Ho: t=2.86, df=20, P=0.01). This raised the possibility that Honorine’s 
performance might be the cause of the finding that, as a group, subjects were able to 
choose the correct target more often than chance. I therefore repeated the replicated 
goodness of fit test (Sokal and Rohlf, 1995) for observed ratios of correct to incorrect 
choices (null hypothesis 1:1), excluding Ho from this analysis. A test for 
heterogeneity showed that the data were homogeneous (G=1.34, df=5, P=0.85), 
allowing us to conduct our analysis on the pooled data. The outcome of this test was 
significant (G=5.20, df=1, P=0.02), implying that, although Honorine’s performance 
improved over the course of the experiment, this trend was not driving the effect. 
When examining choice behaviour together with gaze following for each 
subject, I found that a subject’s visual co-orientation and its ultimate choice of search 
location were closely linked. Using a chi-square test, I found that when a lemur 
successfully co-oriented with the model, it was significantly more likely to choose the 
correct location. When, instead, it looked to the location opposite to the model’s gaze, 
it was more likely to choose the incorrect location (Hy: X²=96.23, df=1, P<0.001; Hu: 
X²=25.77, df=1, P<0.001 ; Ho: X²=100.77, df=1, P<0.001; He: X²=83.71, df=1, 
P<0.001; Ro: X²=40.82, df=1, P<0.001; Ru: X²=39.13, df=1, P<0.001; Figure 5.8). I 
also explored the connection between visual co-orientation and ultimate choice by 
conducting Pearson’s correlations, which yielded similar results (Hy: r=0.69, df=1, 
P<0.001; Hu: r=0.38, df=1, P<0.001; Ho: r=0.71, df=1, P<0.001; He: r=0.79, df=1, 
P<0.001; Ro: r=0.46, df=1, P<0.001; Ru: r=0.43, df=1, P<0.001). 
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Figure 5.8 – First visual inspection and ultimate choice. Data showing both the location of first visual 
inspections and ultimate choice of barrier, grouped by subject. Trials in which the subject first looked 
to the same location as the model (“target”) are in purple, and trials in which the subject first looked to 
the location opposite to that of the model’s gaze (“anti-target”) are in red. These data are further 
divided into correct (solid) and incorrect (patterned) choices. 
 126 
So, when paired with the information provided by the lemurs’ first visual 
inspections upon seeing the model, my analysis shows that when they follow gaze, 
lemurs do preferentially act upon the co-oriented target. 
 
5.2.3 – Discussion  
 
As in Experiment 1, the data concerning first visual inspection upon seeing the 
model provides further experimental evidence that lemurs are able to follow gaze of 
conspecifics. 
Up to now, the abilities of non-human primates to interpret gaze have seemed 
puzzling: many species have been shown to look in the same direction as others, yet 
in object-choice tasks they failed to use this information to access hidden resources. 
This contrast presented a paradox: what is the function of gaze following if it is not 
used for such a basic function as locating resources? Clear conclusions have been 
hindered because object-choice tasks and studies exploring visual co-orientation, 
though investigating different aspects of the same ability, have remained separate. 
Although chimpanzees were shown to follow an experimenter’s gaze in a sampling of 
trials in one object-choice experiment (Povinelli et al., 1999), neither this nor other 
studies have systematically explored visual co-orientation behaviour in tandem with 
subjects’ responses. My results show that, when both factors are analysed together on 
a trial-by-trial basis, there is indeed a connection between visual co-orientation and 
foraging choices. While the mean object-choice performance of subjects hovered at 
chance levels, much like that of other species tested in similar experiments, this is 
because neither gaze following nor object choice work like a reflex. Lemurs did not 
always follow gaze, and they did not always choose the object at which they were 
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looking. However, if their gaze following and object choice were independent, one 
would expect a random distribution of choices whether or not the subject had 
followed the gaze of the model. What I find is precisely the opposite: that the lemurs’ 
response to the model’s gaze closely influenced their choice behaviour. When they 
followed gaze, they tended to choose the primed object; if they did not follow gaze, 
they tended to choose the non-cued object. 
This link between gaze-following and ultimate choice is one that would have 
gone unnoticed without analysing together gaze following and choice. I therefore 
argue that other non-human primate subjects’ failure to perform at a high level of 
correct choices in an object-choice task does not imply they are incapable of using 
gaze at all. I encourage other researchers to re-examine the details of their subjects’ 
behaviour during these tasks in order to explore fully the link between gaze-following 
behaviour and the ultimate choice.  
 
 
5.3 – General Discussion 
 
While these results resolve the apparent evolutionary paradox, at least for 
lemurs, they do not necessarily indicate that lemurs are capable of full mentalistic 
attribution of perceptual states. In other words, the link between the lemurs’ 
successful visual co-orientation and their above chance choice behaviour is not 
evidence that they understand gaze at the level of mental perspective taking – 
representing others as having the inner experience of seeing or attending. In such a 
case, sometimes called “high-level” gaze following (Tomasello et al., 1999; Burkart 
& Heschl, 2006), an individual follows the gaze of another in order to see what he is 
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seeing. In contrast to this stands “low-level” (Call et al., 1998; Burkart & Heschl, 
2006) or ‘ecological’ (Butterworth, 1995) gaze following, in which an individual has 
a tendency to look in the same direction of others until seeing something of interest. 
The results presented in this chapter suggest something in between. Instead, it is 
possible that lemurs interpret gaze functionally without understanding the mental 
states involved, by tending to act upon objects at which they happen to be looking, 
and reliably looking at objects to which other individuals are attending – a 
phenomenon I call ‘gaze priming.’ Gaze priming is defined as the process by which 
an object or location becomes more salient for an observer, as a result of its following 
another individual's attention to that object or location. Depending on the social and 
environmental context, and the information gathered as a result of following gaze, this 
individual acts differentially in relation to that object. Consequently, the resulting 
behavioural response is flexible and can be appropriately different for dangerous or 
positive stimuli. On this hypothesis, visual co-orientation is indeed used to locate 
objects of interest in the environment (Emery, 2000; Zuberbühler, 2008) and could 
also be efficient as a mechanism of social learning, as has been postulated (Emery et 
al., 1997), but need not involve reasoning about unobservable mental states (see 
Chapter 6). What I report here is a candidate system for the evolutionary origins of 
more complex gaze following, as found in humans. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
It has been argued that social interactions monitored by the visual domain 
(e.g., individual recognition by sight rather than smell, recognising threatening or 
receptive body postures, witnessing which individuals engage in grooming or 
altercations with others) have played an important part in primate evolution, and that 
cognitive abilities (both social and non-social) have evolved along with social 
sophistication in primate species (Jolly, 1966; Barton, 1998; Emery, 2000). Some 
have claimed that although lemurs live in complex social groups, their performance 
on cognitive tasks fails to compare to that of simian species (e.g., Jolly, 1966). This 
has led to the idea that cognitive abilities emerged as a result of the demands 
associated with social complexity, and not vice versa (Jolly, 1966). 
Since prosimian visual acuity is lower than that of other primates, researchers 
have suggested they rely on olfaction rather than vision (Brothers, 1990; Sauther et 
al., 1999; Kay & Kirk, 2000; Gilad et al., 2004). If prosimians do not navigate their 
social environment using visual attention, and are confirmed to not perform as well as 
simian primates on cognitive tasks, this would provide valuable evidence to support 
the hypothesis that visual social interactions created the necessary conditions for the 
evolution of complex cognition. In this case, prosimians’ hypothesised reliance on 
olfactory or auditory information might explain the cognitive differences that have 
been reported for simian and prosimian primates. 
Unfortunately, lemurs have until very recently often been left out of cognitive 
studies and have not been given a fair chance to prove their abilities, leaving a 
significant taxonomic gap in our understanding of primate cognition, as was pointed 
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out by Tomasello and Call (1997). Now a range of experiments have tested lemurs’ 
abilities to manipulate tools, enumerate objects, and reason about ordinal 
relationships, and have shown that lemurs do have skills in object cognition that are 
very similar to those of monkeys, even though these tasks were given in the visual 
domain (e.g. Genty et al., 2004; Santos et al., 2005a; Santos et al., 2005b). It follows, 
then, that lemurs should be next tested in social cognition tasks in order to evaluate 
properly their social skills and determine whether these species are, after all, able to 
use social visual information.  
The aim of my PhD was to systematically explore, for the first time, the socio-
cognitive abilities of lemurs in order to begin filling this gap. I chose to focus on skills 
associated with social referencing: that is, the ability to gather and use appropriately 
social information (Feinman, 1982). As such, I aimed to find out whether lemurs 
attend to others in some contexts more than other contexts and in what ways any such 
changes in attention are manifest. I went on to explore whether lemurs are able to 
modify their behaviour based on the information they gather. 
In this closing chapter, I will first summarise the findings of the six 
experiments that make up my dissertation. Next, I will consider what insight my 
results are able to provide into the cognitive systems that may be at play and how 
these results speak to whether lemurs are capable of mental state attribution. I will 
then discuss how individual differences in task performance might affect the 
interpretation of results, as well as how data collected from experiments with captive 
animals can relate to the behaviour of wild populations.  
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6.1 – Summary of findings 
 
 Here I will review the results obtained in the six experiments detailed in my 
dissertation by discussing several broad themes: in what contexts lemurs seek out 
social cues, to which social cues lemurs attend, and how lemurs modify their own 
behaviour based on the social cues they observe. For comparison with simian primate 
species I will also include a brief note on the performance of these species on similar 
tasks. 
For ease of discussion, specific experiments will be referred to by the chapter 
in which they appeared and the order in which they were described. For example, 
“experiment 3.2” denotes the second experiment of chapter 3. 
 
6.1.1 – Do lemurs seek information by attending to others? 
 
In what contexts do lemurs visually refer to others? 
 
I presented lemurs with ambiguous and unambiguous foraging contexts in 
experiment 3.2 by giving them foods with which they were familiar or completely 
unfamiliar. Subjects did not reliably spend more total time looking at their testing 
partner when presented with novel, as compared to familiar, foods, but they did use a 
different looking strategy in these two conditions. When lemurs were given familiar 
food, they looked to their testing partners in frequent, but short, glances. However, 
when given foods with which they had no experience, each individual glance to their 
testing partner lasted longer. It has been argued that longer individual glances serve to 
allow an observer to extract more information about causal relationships, the 
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consequences of actions, and other types of information that would be more difficult 
to gather by using a cursory monitoring strategy (Cohen, 1972; Range & Huber, 
2007). As lemurs exhibited longer individual looks when presented with novel food, I 
suggest that they were able to recognise an unfamiliar situation as such and seek 
potentially useful behavioural cues from other individuals in a way comparable to 
what has been described in human developmental literature as ‘social referencing’ 
(Feinman, 1982). Marmosets have also been shown to use a monitoring strategy 
involving long individual glances when watching conspecifics engage in problem 
solving tasks, but not when watching conspecifics engage in exploratory behaviour 
(Range & Huber, 2007), indicating that lemurs and monkeys share the capacity to 
recognise instances in which useful information can be gathered and also to then 
modify their behaviour in order to do so. 
Lemurs also showed differences in their visual attention when presented with 
ambiguous social situations (experiment 4.1). I established a ‘normal’ interaction of 
allowing subjects to consume raisins that I handed to them (baseline condition) and 
measured their latency to look to my face. When presenting lemurs with an 
anomalous social interaction (test condition) in which I instead took the raisin away 
from them, I found that lemurs looked to my face more quickly. This was despite the 
fact that the lemurs’ desired object (the raisin) was not located anywhere near my 
face. The differential looking exhibited in this experiment corroborates the results of 
experiment 3.2 to suggest that lemurs seek out social information when confronted 
with ambiguous situations. Studies with simian primates have yielded similar results 
as monkeys (Anderson et al., 2007), apes (e.g. Leavens et al., 1996; Russell et al., 
1997), and typical human children (e.g. Walden & Baxter, 1989; Phillips et al., 1992) 
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all refer to the face of a human experimenter when presented with an anomaly and, 
like as the lemurs did in experiments 4.1 and 4.2, engage in gaze alternation.  
 
To what social cues do lemurs visually attend? 
 
 I found that lemurs were able to visually co-orient with a photograph of a 
conspecific looking in a particular direction, indicating that static visual information is 
sufficient to elicit a gaze-following response. In other words, subjects did not require 
other information (e.g., auditory cues) in order to look in the same direction as other 
individuals (experiments 5.1 and 5.2). This is an ability shared with Old World 
monkeys (Lorincz et al., 1999; Scerif et al., 2004) and apes (Horton & Caldwell, 
2006), which have also been shown to follow the direction of gaze of a photographic 
model. 
I also explored to which specific physical cues lemurs responded when co-
orienting with others (experiment 5.1) and found that lemurs were able to correctly 
prioritise head orientation over body orientation when these cues conflicted. Further, 
this configuration was neither more nor less effective for gaze following than when 
these cues were in agreement. This is another measure on which lemurs and simian 
primates behave similarly, as Old World monkeys have been found to correctly co-
orient when head and body direction conflict (Lorincz et al., 1999). 
 
The results summarised in this section provide evidence that lemurs are able to 
employ appropriate visual attention strategies (e.g., looking time and cue 
prioritisation) in order to gather social information, and that they are also able to 
distinguish situations in which social information would be beneficial. Evolutionarily, 
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these are highly valuable skills. Visually attending to others can allow an observer to 
learn about food palatability or the location of resources, or help an observer predict 
another individual’s next action. But do lemurs use social information for these 
purposes after they have gathered it? In other words, do lemurs modify their 
behaviour based on what they see when attending to others? 
 
6.1.2 – Are lemurs able to use social cues to modify their own behaviour? 
 
Are lemurs able to interpret social information regarding food palatability? 
  
I found that when lemurs witnessed another individual reject a food item, they 
were more hesitant when trying the food themselves (experiment 3.1). That is, they 
took significantly longer to reach out and grab the same type of food they had just 
seen a conspecific spit out. This was not merely a consequence of being in the 
presence of a group member that was not eating. Subjects were quick to try these 
same foods when a non-eating conspecific was present and they had not previously 
witnessed that individual reject the food. Despite their sensitivity to group members’ 
disgust reactions, however, lemurs still brought food items to their faces for closer 
inspection (including sniffing and licking), though the amount of such behaviour 
could not be measured. In other words, the behaviour of their group members was not 
enough to elicit food avoidance, which is similar to findings in spider monkeys 
(Fairbanks, 1975) and vervet monkeys (Cambefort, 1981), but contradicts work with 
cotton-top tamarins that showed these individuals were sensitive enough to 
conspcifics’ disgust reactions to avoid a preferred food without personal inspection 
(Snowdon & Boe, 2003) 
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Lemurs’ hesitancy to try food, but failure to avoid the food all together, shows 
that lemurs are able to incorporate information about food palatability available from 
others’ reactions, but may rely more fully on personal experience, when making their 
own foraging decisions. However, as the foods used in experiment 3.1 were familiar 
foods and were treated with an unpalatable, but nontoxic, substance, the risk of tasting 
these foods themselves was very low for lemurs. It is possible that when confronted 
with a group member rejecting a novel food, a lemur might go on to avoid that same 
novel food, rather than merely hesitating to handle it. 
 
Can lemurs use others’ direction of attention to locate hidden objects? 
 
In experiment 5.2, I asked whether lemurs would modify their behaviour 
based on the direction of attention of a conspecific. When I presented lemurs with two 
barriers, behind one of which food was hidden, I found that subjects used the gaze 
direction of a photographed conspecific model to select the correct location. When 
lemurs followed the model’s gaze, they were more likely to choose the barrier behind 
which the food was hidden. But when lemurs did not co-orient with the model they 
were more likely to choose incorrectly. These results indicate that lemurs’ gaze 
following reactions had consequences for their foraging choices, as subjects modified 
their behaviour according to another individual’s direction of attention. This result 
stands in contrast to many other studies exploring non-human primates’ performance 
on object-choice tasks. Those studies report that subjects are typically unable to use 
attentional cues to locate hidden resources, even when these same animals exhibit 
sophisticated gaze-following capabilities. However, gaze following and choice had 
never before been analysed in tandem in experiments using an object-choice 
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paradigm, and the results I obtained by performing this type of analysis suggest that 
perhaps similar patterns would have been found if the same analysis had been 
conducted. 
 
Do lemurs modify their gesture use according to a recipient’s attention? 
 
 Lemurs were unable to use social information to modify their use of a trained 
pointing gesture (4.1 and 4.2). Lemurs were not quicker to point, nor did they point 
more frequently, nor did their points last longer when I could see them than when I 
could not. This was evidently not due to a lack of information about my attentional 
state because lemurs looked at my face frequently throughout each trial. Subjects 
simply failed to use this information when pointing. This could be because I was 
expecting lemurs to use communicatively a trained action that was possibly arbitrary 
to them. Another explanation for these results, though, is that I was asking them to 
recognise various attentional states of a human rather than a conspecific, and to 
modify their behaviour accordingly. As lemurs have been reported not to follow a 
human experimenter’s direction of attention (Itakura, 1996; Anderson & Mitchell, 
1999), perhaps my finding that they do not respond to differences in an 
experimenter’s attentional state should not be seen as surprising. Simian primates that 
have been shown to be capable of visually co-orienting with human experimenters 
have also been shown to gesture discriminatively based on an experimenter’s 
attentional state (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Kaminski et al., 2004). 
I also found that lemurs did not modify their use of gaze alternation, a natural 
and untrained behaviour, according to my attentional state. One possible explanation 
is that subjects could have been waiting to engage in attentional contact, which would 
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require my attention to be directed at them. As such, subjects could have been 
continually monitoring my attentional state throughout the trial, no matter its 
direction. Alternatively, lemurs could have been searching for a behavioural cue that 
would indicate my intention, such as a threatening expression or eating the food 
myself. In either case, lemurs’ use of gaze alternation might not differ depending on 
whether or not I could see them. Therefore, it remains unclear what information the 
lemurs were extracting from paying attention to me.  
 
 These results show that lemurs are able to follow the gaze of a conspecific in 
order to locate hidden food items, and that they are also able to use conspecific social 
cues to help determine the palatability of food before tasting it themselves. Although 
results regarding lemurs’ ability to modify their use of a trained pointing gesture 
according to a human’s attentional state are negative, this topic has not been 
exhausted and deserves further exploration. 
 
6.1.3 – What do we now know about lemur social cognition? 
 
 Although lemurs have often been considered the not-so-intelligent relative of 
simian primates (e.g., Jolly, 1966), my experiments provide further evidence that this 
is not the case. For the first time, lemurs have shown an ability to seek out social 
information in appropriate contexts and also to go on to use that information to 
modify their own behaviour, both of which are skills associated with social 
referencing. These results begin to provide much-needed insight into the evolution of 
the primate mind by filling a gap in the literature that has been left open for many 
decades.  
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6.2 – Are lemurs capable of mental state attribution? 
 
When considering the results of research that has focused on a certain animal’s 
socio-cognitive abilities, an audience might wonder whether these findings suggest 
that this particular species has a theory of mind. ‘Theory of mind’ is a term that was 
coined three decades ago by Premack and Woodruff (1978) and is defined as the 
ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, to others and 
to oneself. While the focus of my research was not whether lemurs have a theory of 
mind, and a satisfying response is outside the scope of a PhD dissertation consisting 
of six experiments, I will briefly address this issue.  
My research explored whether lemurs use visual attention of others to modify 
their own behaviour. The understanding of visual attention is believed to be an 
important component of theory of mind, without which it might be impossible to 
understand mental states such as intentions, knowledge, and beliefs in others (Baron-
Cohen, 1991; Kummer et al., 1996). One of the most debated questions, then, is 
whether non-human primates are able to interpret another individual’s direction of 
attention as an overt behaviour resulting from the internal and, thereby, invisible 
mental state of seeing (e.g. Povinelli et al., 2003). 
It has been argued that it is possible to understand another individual’s visual 
perspective without understanding his “mental perspective” (Byrne & Whiten, 1992), 
and my data cannot provide evidence that anything aside from visual perspective 
taking is the case for lemurs. It is possible lemurs can appreciate the relationship 
between head orientation and the location of some visual stimulus without 
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understanding the attentional experience of another individual (Horton & Caldwell, 
2006). Another individual’s direction of attention, and the relationship it has to 
objects or events in the environment, can be used to give a “primitive” psychology – 
to make sense of past actions and predict future actions, without needing to 
understand or invoke the mental states of seeing, belief, or knowledge associated with 
theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1994). This is achieved simply by understanding that 
attention is directed towards targets, that attention is determined by gaze direction, 
and that individuals usually act upon (or react to) objects to which they are attending 
(Baron-Cohen, 1994; Gómez, 1996). This “aboutness” of gaze is a way to deal with 
the causal link of attention to objects without needing to attribute mental states to 
others (Gómez, 2005b). A mechanism like this one, however, should not be viewed as 
vastly inferior to a theory of mind system, as both mentalistic and non-mentalistic 
interpretations of gaze-object relationships allow an individual to appropriately 
navigate and manage its social environment and require a great deal of cognitive skill. 
Responding to a relation between gaze and targets may already, however, be 
an adaptation to one primitive, but key, feature of mentalism – so-called 
“intentionality,” defined as the property of mental states to be directed at or point to 
something other than themselves (Dennett & Haugeland, 1987). Adaptations to “see” 
others’ gaze (an overt behaviour) as directed to targets may have been a starting point 
for more complex adaptations to code intentional relations in terms of covert mental 
states (Gómez, 2008). 
In experiment 5.2, I found that lemurs preferentially acted on targets to which 
other individuals attended. I proposed a mechanism called “gaze priming” to account 
for this behaviour: a stimulus in the environment becomes more salient to an observer 
after another individual directs its attention toward it, and, as a result, the observer 
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acts differentially in response to that object. As environmental and social context can 
influence the precise way in which an individual would respond, the observer does not 
need to reason about the intentions or belief of that other individual in order to 
respond appropriately. This is a mechanism on which higher-levels of social cognition 
such a mental state attribution could be built, but these higher-levels are not necessary 
for that individual’s success in coping with social information. This fits nicely with 
the ideas presented above: although mental state attribution can be a useful skill for 
leading a life in a social group, it is not the only way in which an individual can 
effectively discover, learn about, and respond to stimuli in the environment.  
Tomasello and colleagues (2003) suggested that theory of mind is not black-
or-white, yes-or-no. Instead, it could be viewed as an umbrella term that covers a 
wide range of socio-cognitive processes. The task becomes, then, to focus on 
questions that are more specific than “Does animal Y have a theory of mind?” 
Instead, focus should be placed on the specific ways in which animals deal with the 
social environment. I set out to explore the visual attention mechanisms lemurs use 
when presented with various social cues. While my research shows that lemurs are 
able to recognise and respond to the external behavioural manifestations of mental 
states, such as direction of attention, these results cannot provide insight into whether 
lemurs conceptualise those mental states when doing so. As I have argued, systems 
that do not involve mental state attribution can be highly sophisticated and produce 
similar (if not the same) results as a theory of mind mechanism. 
 
 
6.3 – Individual differences 
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 Although individual differences in performance are traditionally ignored in 
discussions of primate cognition, I feel it is an important topic to discuss here as my 
dissertation concerns two species that have not been tested in experiments exploring 
social cognition. 
While some individual differences recorded in my dissertation are possibly 
explained by the sex of the animal (e.g., looking time in experiment 3.2) or the 
number of trials completed for a specific subject (e.g., looking time in experiment 
5.1), there remain a few instances in which some lemurs failed to behave as the rest of 
the group did for which it is more difficult to account. Sometimes a lemur or two 
would perform in a way supporting the null hypothesis  (e.g., latency to looking to my 
face in experiment 4.1), while the majority of subjects’ behaviour supported a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. In other experiments the opposite occurred, as it was 
the majority of subjects that supported the null hypothesis and just one or two others 
who broke away from this pattern (e.g., gaze alternation differences in experiments 
4.1 and 4.2).  
Most researchers recognise that some differences in performance are attributed 
to natural variation (a phenomenon upon which Darwin’s theory of evolution 
depends) and allow for this in their data. Rather than expecting all subjects to behave 
in exactly the same way, they instead look for patterns within their subject set, 
sometimes explicitly mentioning they have done so (e.g., “The results indicate that, 
allowing for individual differences, capuchins are able to…” (Vick & Anderson, 
2000)). 
In lemurs, experimenters have reported high variability in tactics used to cope 
with a competitive experimenter. In studies conducted by Genty and colleagues 
(Genty & Roeder, 2006; Genty et al., 2008), the researchers reported that each subject 
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developed a different method to deal with a problem of competition with a human. 
Some lemurs withheld information by not pointing at all, others refused to participate 
in the study, and others sometimes exhibited deceptive pointing. These differences in 
strategy could not be explained by the age, sex, or rearing history of the animals. 
Differences in individual subjects’ performance are also found in ape studies. 
In their object-choice task, Itakura and colleagues (1999) reported that three out of 
four chimpanzees improved as the task was modified, while one did not. Zimmerman 
and collaborators (In press) found individual differences in pointing performance, as 
two subjects failed to point to a tool that was needed to obtain a food item, while the 
rest of the group was able to do so. And Tomasello and colleagues (1999) found that 
while the majority of subjects were able to follow gaze geometrically, there were a 
few who did not. 
These studies provide valuable examples of “a few bad apples” that did not 
succeed in spoiling the whole bunch, but there are also cases in which the opposite 
occurred: a minority of subjects that “passed” a task when the rest of the group could 
not. For example, in their work with domestic pigs, Held and colleagues (2001) found 
just one out of ten individuals followed a conspecific who had witnessed the hiding of 
a food item as a strategy to find the food themselves, while the others instead 
developed a side or positional bias. In this case, the majority of subjects showed no 
evidence of visual perspective taking, thereby supporting the null hypothesis, while a 
striking minority of one subject recognised and took advantage of what another 
individual had seen. This difference was not explained by learning effects or multiple 
sampling. 
Given the high levels of distraction in some environments, due to social 
pressures for which an experiment cannot control or even the time of year (personally, 
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I found it nearly impossible to conduct any studies while the lemurs were in breeding 
season), combined with the natural variation one would expect to find, it is 
unsurprising to obtain data that varies slightly across subjects. As my dissertation 
focuses on exploring the competences of lemurs, and not individual lemurs’ ability to 
perform a specific task, this variation does not affect the overall interpretations of my 
results. It is the fact that the effect was found in most, or even a few, individuals that 
counts. It shows us that the cognitive capability is there, somewhere, and needs 
further exploration.  
 
 
6.4 – But what about the wild? 
 
 Another topic worth addressing is how captive experiments relate to how 
animals in the wild go about their daily lives. In research there is always a trade-off 
between studying behaviour in a natural setting that does not allow for control of 
external factors and studying behaviour in captivity under controlled conditions in 
order to identify the mechanisms involved in cognition (Tomasello & Call, 1997). The 
conclusions drawn in either case should be slightly cautious as a result.  
 It has been posited that cognitive demand on an individual varies according to 
ecological factors, such as food availability and features of the environment (Boesch, 
2007). It is possible, then, that the difference in ecological factors faced by wild and 
captive populations can result in a difference in the manifestations of their true 
cognitive capacities. For example, chimpanzees may very seldom (if ever) point 
manually in the wild simply because they have no need to do so (Menzel, 1973). In 
other words, behavioural cues such as gaze direction, body orientation, and 
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vocalisations might be enough to solve the problems of every-day life in the wild: 
locating and acquiring food resources, avoiding predators, etc. For apes in captivity, 
the story is different. These animals experience limitations to what areas they can 
access due to cage mesh, etc., and it is common for them to want to obtain items they 
are unable to acquire on their own. So, a problem for which pointing is the only 
solution is something apes might only encounter in captive conditions (Tomasello & 
Call, 1997).  
Alison Jolly (1966) has also argued that the wide array of distractions in the 
environment hinders the ability of animals to attend to specific objects, agents, or 
events. As a result, wild animals may not discover opportunities to manipulate or 
otherwise investigate interesting items, limiting the number of chances field 
researchers have to study an animal’s ability to reason about objects or events in their 
environment. The controlled conditions associated with captivity, however, make it 
easier for a subject to notice and take interest in whatever it is a human experimenter 
wants them to, allowing for more thorough investigation of their cognitive capacities. 
It is possible, then, that certain circumstances allow animals to produce 
behaviours they might not use in other contexts, but the capacity to produce the 
behaviour at all must be there from the start (Leavens et al., 1996; Boesch, 2007). It is 
important to keep in mind, then, that wild individuals must possess the capacity for 
the cognitive abilities captive individuals show in the laboratory, otherwise the 
captive individuals would not be able to produce such results in the first place (Jolly, 
1966; Poss et al., 2006). 
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6.5 – In closing… 
 
 It has long been thought that, although lemurs have “monkey-type societies” 
(in other words, many species live in social groups that incorporate kin and non-kin, 
allowing differential social relationships, dominance hierarchies, etc), lemurs have not 
evolved “monkey-like intelligence” (Jolly, 1966; Byrne & Whiten, 1988). This led 
some researchers (e.g., Jolly, 1966) to posit that the demands of social complexity 
created the conditions necessary for the evolution of cognition. That is, group living 
came before cognition, and not the other way around. As such, while lemurs live in 
social groups comparable to those of simian primates, it is possible that they had not 
yet developed the sophisticated cognitive skills found in these species. However, 
prosimian primates were typically overlooked in studies exploring social cognition, 
creating a gap in our understanding of the evolution of social cognition and leaving 
this theory without crucial evidence. 
I found that lemurs refer visually to other individuals in cases of ambiguity, 
and go on to use this information in foraging situations. Further, I found that lemurs 
are able to co-orient with conspecifics, using the correct cues when doing so, and can 
go on to use this information to find hidden objects. Converging evidence from 
separate but related lines of research produce a larger, clearer picture than any one 
study can in isolation (Tomasello 1995). By exploring several different but related 
topics, I have been able to provide strong evidence that lemurs have a greater level of 
social understanding than previously thought, and are capable of social referencing. 
Given the evidence also available from research with simian primates, I would like to 
claim that lemurs do, in fact, have “monkey-like intelligence.” So, though the 
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conclusions arrived at by Jolly (1966) might yet be true, lemur species in general can 
no longer be used as supporting evidence.  
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